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ABSTRACT 
Existing literature on the topic of a potential Korean reunification focuses 
primarily on three major areas of concern: the impact to regional and international 
security, fiscal costs analysis, and anticipation of various reunification scenarios. 
Assuming a unification under Seoul’s guidance, this thesis will seek to bridge a gap that 
exists in the field by examining the likely social implications of reunification on the 
Korean peninsula. It will argue that despite the similarities in culture, language, historical 
legacies, and ethnic roots, two particular sets of social issues—population migration and 
social discrimination—will prove to be more divisive and socially costly than those 
similar issues experienced in the aftermath of the German reunification. This thesis will 
conclude that seven decades of separation has created two vastly contradictory and 
incompatible Korean societies that will make the social integration of the two Koreas as 
sensitive, challenging, and complex as the more often debated security and economic 
repercussions. As such, the potential social implications should be discussed on an equal 
footing with security and economic consequences of the Korean reunification. 
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Since the historic meeting between the two Korean leaders in April 2018 and the 
subsequent signing of the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of 
the Korean Peninsula, the prospect of Korean reunification has resurfaced as a topical issue 
of interest for the international community. Existing studies have thoroughly investigated 
the potential security and economic implications in preparation for such an event. As such, 
the current literature on the Korean reunification focuses primarily on three major areas of 
concern: security, both international and domestic; economic costs and breakdowns; and 
analysis of various reunification scenarios, with a majority of scholars assuming a scenario 
in which the capitalist South absorbs the communist North. Yet, analysis of social 
implications, as it relates to integrating two very contradictory societies with mutually 
exclusive interests, is scant. Thus, to ensure adequate and well-rounded preparation on the 
social front, the potential social integration issues of Korean reunification merits further 
analysis. 
This thesis seeks to bridge a gap that exists in the field by examining the social 
implications of a potential Korean reunification and highlighting possible, yet highly likely, 
social integration issues that will surface whilst reuniting the two Korean societies. The 
thesis argues that despite the similarities in culture, language, historical legacies, and ethnic 
roots, the repercussions of two particular sets of social issues—population migration and 
social discrimination—will prove to be more divisive and socially costly than those similar 
issues experienced in the aftermath of the German reunification. Though this thesis does 
not seek to provide a policy prescription nor suggest that South Korea should or should not 
pursue unification in the future, it does argue that understanding the nature and severity of 
the social integration challenges posed by the possible unification is crucial not only to 
anticipating and preparing for the challenges themselves, but also because these issues 
affect how and whether both Koreas, the South in particular, pursue unification in the first 
place.  
Knowing how differently the two societies have evolved since the end of the 
Korean War, it is not much of a surprise that the general consensus in literature suggests a 
2 
“drab future” for the North Koreans who must come to terms with their outdated and 
obsolete skill sets, and face diminished social status after the reunification.1 Much social 
discrimination is likely to stem from two major perceptions: first, the southern bias that the 
North Koreans are uncultured, uneducated, and inferior; second, the Northerners’ disdain 
for South Korea’s materialistic and superficial culture, in which it has become the norm 
for appearances and wealth to inform societal relations and statuses.  
The relationship between the two Koreas has been episodic at best, and seven 
decades of separation has created two vastly divergent and incompatible societies. On 
average, South Koreans are fifteen times more prosperous than their northern 
counterparts.2 While South Korea successfully democratized and now consistently ranks 
among the world’s top 15 economies, North Korea occupies a seat among the world’s 
poorest nations, and is one of the most socially, politically, and technologically isolated 
nations in the world. For these reasons, the Korean reunification will be unlike any other 
reunifications we have seen and studied in the past. However, among the examples of past 
reunifications, lessons can certainly be drawn from Germany’s shortcomings and tailored 
to suit the needs of the Korean reunification. Thus, this thesis will frequently reference 
examples from Germany’s social integration experience as an underpinning touchstone for 
the potential Korean reunification. 
The German example shows that social integration issues are difficult, important, 
and longer-lasting than often expected. Almost three decades post-German reunification, 
“a phantom wall still stands” with East Germany’s [Gross Domestic Product] GDP only 
70% that of the west, its unemployment rate almost double that of West Germany, and the 
salaries of its workers, on average, 20% lower than that of West German workers.3 A recent 
study conducted by the Berlin Institute for Population and Development concluded that 
50% of Germans believe there are more differences than commonalities between the 
                                                 
1 Andrei Lankov, “Post-Unification, a Drab Future for North(Ern) Koreans,” North Korea News, 
November 2, 2015, www.nknews.org/2015/11/post-unification-a-drab-future-for-northern-koreans/. 
2 Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York, New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2013), 402. 
3 Katie Engelhart, “A Divided Germany, Decades After the Wall,” Rogers Digital Media, May 25, 
2014, https://www.macleans.ca/politics/worldpolitics/a-divided-germany-decades-after-the-wall/. 
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“Ossis” (Easterners) and “Wessis” (Westerners).4 Furthermore, there has been a growing 
trend in western impatience with sending US$3 trillion dollars in subsidies and welfare 
eastward since the reunification, which has contributed to a pattern of eastern resentment 
over the west’s continued and unequal prosperity. If the German reunification serves as an 
example for the Korean reunification, then the consideration of the potential social 
implications warrants further analysis, thus partly explaining why the former-East and 
West societies are still functioning in parallel almost three decades after the German 
reunification.5  
But Germany also differs from the Koreas in important ways: East and West 
Germany maintained a porous border with frequent and reliable lines of communication; 
the two were separated half the amount of time that the Koreas have now been split; and 
neither were involved in a protracted war in which the East committed a series of human 
rights violations. On the other hand, the Koreas have diverged so drastically that South 
Korea’s economy is now roughly 30–40 times that of North Korea. The income gap 
between the north and south is much bigger than Germany’s ever was, the hostility between 
the two much more direct and aggressive, and the free flow of information and 
communication practically non-existent. 
The Korean reunification will almost certainly be a messy, costly, and exhausting 
endeavor that will test the social fabric of the two Korean societies. The pre-famine period 
in which South Koreans viewed North Korean defectors as high value assets with political 
utility is over.6 According to Andrei Lankov, South Korean society no longer supports 
either mass defection of North Koreans and their subsequent influx into South Korea or 
wishes to “sacrifice their hard-won prosperity for the sake of [North Koreans] who, 
                                                 
4 Kate Connolly, “German Reunification 25 Years On: How Different Are East and West Really?” 
Guardian, October 2, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/02/german-reunification-25-
years-on-how-different-are-east-and-west-really. 
5 Marta Zawilska-Florczuk and Artur Ciechanowicz, “One Country, Two Societies? Germany Twenty 
Years After Reunification,” trans. Ilona Duchnowicz and Nicholas Furnival, Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich 
Im Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies, no. 35 (February 2011): 16. 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_35_en_0.pdf. 
6 Andrei Lankov, “Bitter Taste of Paradise: North Korean Refugees in South Korea,” Journal of East 
Asian Studies 6, no. 1 (January 2006): 107, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800000059. 
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whatever the Republic of Korea constitution says, clearly belong to another and rather 
hostile state.”7 Potentially burdensome social integration issues have caused a noticeable 
shift in South Korean public opinion toward wariness of unification, surely impacting the 
likelihood of it even happening in the first place. As such, it is prudent to start the 
discussion now, and to attempt to predict the major social issues and concerns, to ensure a 
peaceful merger of the two Korean societies. 
The South Korean government currently funds and oversees a compulsory 12-week 
re-settlement program aimed at easing the defectors’ transition into South Korean society. 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) government also provides an initial lump-sum re-settlement 
stipend and offers all newly arrived refugees low-cost public housing. Additionally, the 
defectors are entitled to welfare, unemployment benefits, and other cash incentives during 
their adjustment period.8 While at first glance this seems rather generous and far-reaching, 
the current social integration measures and governmental policies are meant to serve the 
roughly 30,000 North Korean defectors presently living in South Korea, and are in no way 
ready for the full integration of the two Korean societies.9 The degree to which South 
Korean policymakers are willing, dealing, and preparing for the potential social blowback 
of reunification is beyond the scope of this research. However, in the event of Korean 
reunification, implications from social integration will suddenly become a priority. Under 
this kind of pressure, we might expect the South Korean government to develop policies 
that are more crisis driven. In that case, existing social problems could worsen with an 
influx of more northern migrants, or problems could get better since more urgency and 
pressure will be placed on resolving defector issues. This thesis assumes that whatever 
social issues exists now will only become worse post-reunification. For this reason, this 
thesis fundamentally aligns with the pessimistic views of Lankov and Eberstadt who 
                                                 
7 Lankov, “Bitter Taste of Paradise,” 114. 
8 For supplemental information regarding jeongchakkeum (settlement money/payout), see Seo Yeon 
Park, “Street-Level Bureaucracy and Depoliticized North Korean Subjectivity in the Service Provision of 
Hana Center,” Asian Ethnicity 17, no. 2 (February 2016): 199–213, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2016.1151231; also see Andrei Lankov, “Bitter Taste of Paradise: North 
Korean Refugees in South Korea,” Journal of East Asian Studies 6, no. 1 (January 2006): 118. 
9 Park, “Street-Level Bureaucracy and Depoliticized North Korean Subjectivity,” 203–209.  
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contend that social integration of North and South Koreans will be difficult, competitive, 
disappointing, and challenging.10 
In analyzing the various social implications, this thesis employs evidence drawn 
from qualitative analysis of scholarly literature, as well as open source reporting from 
Korean media outlets, which offer particularly perceptive insights into the thoughts of 
average North and South Koreans. The thesis also relies on video recordings, interviews, 
and articles of North Korean defector experiences, as well as surveys, polling data, and 
other empirical evidence from Korean research databases. Both Korean and English 
sources were used in this research, and translations, unless otherwise noted, were done by 
the author. Empirical evidence and quantifiable data were cited when applicable, but it also 
makes logical sense, particularly when discussing potential social discrimination 
challenges that are not easily quantifiable, to rely on first-hand defector accounts and 
testimonies as current North Korean defectors residing in South Korea are reflective of 
much of the segment of the North Korean population most likely to migrate south upon 
reunification (i.e., larger proportion of poorer, economically motivated North Koreans with 
little political utility). Thus, “by examining specific issues that the defectors face in 
adjusting to life in South Korea, one can project the problems a unified Korea might 
encounter” as defector experiences shed light on existing social issues that could worsen 
with complete social integration.11 
To the extent that this thesis discusses the social implications of a potential Korean 
reunification, a certain amount of estimations and conclusions are drawn by analyzing 
existing trends and taking into account the German example. While this thesis does not 
assume that all North Koreans will migrate to South Korea upon reunification, nor that 
those who do migrate south will be as deeply integrated into the South Korean society as 
many of the defectors are now, we can expect that the social issues between North and 
                                                 
10 Nicholas Eberstadt and Judith Banister, “Divided Korea: Demographic and Socioeconomic Issues 
for Reunification,” Population and Development Review 18, no. 3 (September 1992): 505–31. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/1973656. 
11 Tara O, “The Integration of North Korean Defectors in South Korea: Problems and Prospects,” 
International Journal of Korean Studies 15, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 152, 
http://www.icks.org/data/ijks/1482460255_add_file_7.pdf. 
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South Koreans will persist, given that similar issues arose in Germany, and there is 
evidence to confidently suggest that seven decades of separation has created two vastly 
contradictory and irreconcilable Korean societies. Thus, looking at current defector 
experiences sheds much insight into what is to come in the event of reunification, and gives 
good reason to extrapolate that existing negative trends in infrastructure limitations, socio-
spatial inequalities, and discrimination will only worsen with more North Koreans living 
in South Korea. Again, this assumption warrants emphasizing because some analysts might 
hold that the crisis-driven urgency surrounding unification might lead us not to extrapolate 
from current conditions.  
This thesis is organized to analyze the social implications of a potential Korean 
reunification from a South Korean perspective. While the North Korean perspective is 
briefly considered in the conclusion, the bulk of this research approaches social integration 
from a South Korean viewpoint due to the scarcity of credible and verifiable primary and 
secondary sources from North Korea.  
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter II explains the strongest rationale for 
the Korean reunification: shared ethnic identity. It reviews the ethnic historicity that unites 
North and South Koreans in a single ethnic identity, defines preconditions for being 
Korean, and highlights the evolution of intra-South Korean national identity, which is 
undergoing significant changes, particularly among the younger generations. In doing so, 
Chapter II seeks to debunk the prevalent “blood-bound notion” of ethnic unity that is often 
“expected to function as a unifying force across a divided system.”12  
Chapter III examines the North-South migration and population movement that is 
expected in a unified Korea. This migration flow is further sub-analyzed with regard to 
shifts in motivations for defection, growth of the labor crowing effect, and exacerbation of 
infrastructure limitations and socio-spatial inequality. Chapter III outlines the myriad of 
social complications that will arise when North Koreans crowd South Korea’s already 
competitive labor market; compete for basic and critical government services, limited 
                                                 
12 Gi Wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), 164. 
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housing, and schools; and demand more from an already over-stretched South Korean 
infrastructure.  
Chapter IV explores social discrimination and the probable emergence of a class 
system, analyzed in the context of the split of pan-Korean nationalism into two factions of 
South Korean “Us” and North Korean “Them.” It examines the reasons behind the growing 
social distance between North and South Koreans, and notes differences between northern 
and southern cultural and societal values. Chapter IV also addresses the potential social 
discrimination challenges that the North Korean defectors will face when assimilating into 
a vastly different southern society, and argues that social integration will come with an 
underlying layer of discrimination and classification of North Koreans as “second class 
citizens who form a new minority group in the South Korean society.”13 
Chapter V briefly examines social issues from a North Korean perspective in the 
event of a South-North migration. Considering North Korea’s highly lucrative reserve of 
rare earth minerals, Chapter V considers the potential benefits of northern migration by 
South Korean migrants, while also addressing the Northerners’ vulnerability to 
exploitation through the emergence of “carpetbagging” behavior among opportunistic 
southern capitalists.  
Finally, Chapter VI will conclude that the premise of shared ethnic homogeneity as 
the driving force for the Korean unification offers a false sense of unity. Among other 
concerns, the social fallout from mass southern migration by North Korean refugees and 
the subsequent issues raised by the worsening labor market and growing social 
discrimination should give us reason to question any blind push by North and South Korean 
governments towards the reunification of the Korean peninsula.  
                                                 
13 Jih Un Kim and Dong Jin Jang, “Aliens Among Brothers? The Status and Perception of North 
Korean Refugees in South Korea,” Asian Perspective 31, no. 2 (2007): 6, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704587. 
8 
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II. DEBUNKING SHARED ETHNIC UNITY 
According to Shin, “ethnic unity or its perception [is] expected to function as a 
unifying force across a divided system.”14 In this regard, the strongest, and the most 
compelling rationale for the Korean unification is the shared ethnic identity between North 
and South Koreans.15 Despite the South Korean government’s use of these shared ethnic 
ties as the foundation for its push towards reunification, Lankov notes that the “recent years 
have seen a dramatic but not always openly stated change in the official South Korean 
attitude toward defectors; from a policy explicitly aimed at encouraging defection, Seoul 
has moved to the policy of quietly discouraging it.”16 There are two possible explanations 
for this change in southern attitudes. The first is the fear that openly encouraging defection 
will undermine South Korea’s policy of peaceful unification, and destroy what little 
goodwill remains between the two countries. The second reason, and the focus of this 
thesis, is the perception that North Koreans are outsiders, “not quite adjustable to the 
conditions of South Korean society and thus a social and budgetary burden” on South 
Korea.17 In order to further unpack this negative perception of North Koreans as social and 
economic burdens, this chapter first explores the historicity of the shared ethnic identity 
between North and South Koreans. It then examines how civic identity is gradually 
replacing ethnic identity as the determinant factor in what it means to be Korean, thus 
challenging the foundational ethnic rationale upon which the narrative for unification is 
built.  
A. ETHNIC HISTORICITY  
A piece of folklore shared by both North and South Koreans called Dangun unites 
the two groups in a single ethnic identity. Dangun, the son of a God and a human mother, 
                                                 
14 Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea, 164. 
15 Ji Yoon Kim, National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, Joint U.S.-Korea 
Academic Studies (Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute of America, 2014), 97, 
http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/jiyoon_kim.pdf. 
16 Lankov, “Bitter Taste of Paradise,” 1. 
17 Lankov, “Bitter Taste of Paradise,” 1.  
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is credited with creating the Korean race and ruling the Kingdom of Gojoseon, a powerful 
kingdom that consolidated smaller peripheral states to become one of the largest, most 
advanced ancient empires of its time. According to Kim, this myth “epitomizes the ethnic 
identity shared by the Korean people, both North and South.”18 Others, like Shin, argue 
that the Korean national identity is a relatively new concept that developed in response to 
Japanese colonialism in the early 1900s.19 Regardless, whether it is a mythical tale or 
shared anti-Japanese sentiments, Koreans on both sides of the border share a strong 
emphasis on ethnic unity (minjok) and historical bloodlines. Thus, it is important to note 
that this shared ethnic lineage forms the cornerstone of what little link remains between 
North and South Korea since the partition. 
B. DEFINING “KOREANNESS” 
In 2013, the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies published the results of a survey in 
which the South Korean public (a sample of 1000 people) was asked questions regarding 
the Korean national identity and the South Korean attitude towards North Korea. First, 
preconditions for “Koreanness,” or how Korean a person is, were separated into two 
components: an ethnic component and a civic component. The three ethnic components 
were (1) “being born in Korea,” (2) “having the Korean bloodline,” and (3) “living in Korea 
for most of one’s life”; the four civic components were (1) “maintaining Korean 
nationality,” (2) “being able to speak and write in Korean,” (3) “abiding by the Korean 
political and legal system,” and (4) “understanding Korean traditions.”20 Respondents 
were asked to categorize each of the above preconditions or components as either important 
or not important as the benchmark for one’s Koreanness.  
The problem, however, is that the results of the ASAN survey revealed that South 
Korea’s national identity has and still is undergoing significant changes particularly among 
the younger generations. The survey results indicate that South Koreans as a whole 
consider civic identity more important than ethnic identity in determining one’s 
                                                 
18 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 97. 
19 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 97. 
20 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 98–100. 
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“Koreanness.” That is, civic identity is the yardstick by which South Koreans measure how 
“Korean” a person is. Moreover, as Kang and Lee write in support of the survey results, 
though “Korean nationalism has been maintained by an ethnic myth for a long period,” this 
ethnic-oriented Korean nationalism is being challenged due to the changing demographics 
and the evolution of Korea’s national identity.21 Given that the “current discourse and 
policy on unification is based on the premise that Korea will be unified since it is an 
ethnically homogenous nation,”22 if ethnic nationalism fades, then the sense of ethnic unity 
between the two Koreas will become much weaker, thus undermining the main reason for 
unifying the peninsula in the first place.  
When asked if being born in Korea, having a Korean bloodline, or living in Korea 
for the majority of one’s life was an important factor in defining a person’s “Koreanness,” 
69%, 65.8%, and 66.1% of the respondents, respectively, responded “yes.”23 When asked 
about the civic components—whether maintaining a Korean nationality, being able to 
speak and write Korean, abiding by the Korean political and legal system, or understanding 
Korean traditions was an important precondition in determining how Korean a person is—
88.4%, 91.7%, 93.4%, and 91.5% of the respondents, respectively, replied “yes.”24 The 
results of this survey signaled a noticeable shift in what was once considered by South 
Koreans to be indispensable conditions of ethnic nationalism—being born in Korea, having 
a Korean bloodline, and maintaining primary residence in Korea. On this point, Kim 
concludes that “it is apparent that South Koreans’ national identity is undergoing a 
significant change. Once heavily centered on ethnic identity, it is now moving toward civic 
identity.”25 Table 1 summarizes the survey responses. 
                                                 
21 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 97. 
22 Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea, 20. 
23 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 99. 
24 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 99. 
25 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 100. 
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Table 1. Preconditions for “Koreanness”26 
 
 
When the survey results were further subdivided by age groups, ethnic identity was 
less important to the younger generation than it was to the older generation, by and large. 
Whereas only 56.5% of those in their 20s saw being born in Korea as a precondition for 
being Korean, 88.1% of those 60s and older thought that a Korean must be born in Korea.27 
Similarly, while just 56.9% of South Koreans in their 20s believed a person should have a 
Korean bloodline to be considered Korean, 87.2% of those 60 and over saw having Korean 
blood as a necessary trait of a Korean.28  
Examining the components of civic identity further, North Korean defectors are 
automatically granted South Korean citizenships upon registering as a South Korean 
resident. In order to claim residency, all defectors are first screened and interviewed by the 
National Intelligence Service (NIS) to verify their claim as refugees, and confirm that they 
pose no security threat. After completing the screening process, the refugees enter 
Hanawon, a 12-week re-settlement support program funded and regulated by the ROK 
government. Here, North Korean defectors are taught educational courses, which include 
                                                 
26 Adapted from Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 99–100. 
27 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 100. 
28 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 100. 
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“basic vocational training, lectures about Korean history and democracy, the concept of a 
market economy, as well as psychological counseling, career aptitude test, and health 
check-ups.”29 When the twelve weeks are up, each defector is assigned a “re-settlement 
counselor/helper” for two years to serve as a guide through South Korean society and assist 
with personal and professional needs. Thus, under the current law, all North Korean 
refugees entering South Korea post-unification would effectively become South Korean 
citizens, hence meeting the first civic identity criterion that a Korean must maintain a 
Korean nationality (i.e., citizenship). Secondly, as Koreans on both sides of the border 
share the same language, albeit with regional accent differences, the second criterion—
being able to speak and write Korean—is also met without much concern.  
The third precondition may be the most challenging for the North Korean refugees 
to meet: abiding by the Korean political and legal systems. Understandably, having just 
escaped one of the most repressive regimes in the world, North Koreans conditioned under 
juche ideology and indoctrinated into the Kim Dynasty’s personality cult will likely find 
adjustment to South Korean politics and legal system difficult and shocking. Not only will 
they have a hard time comprehending and partaking in democratic politics like 
campaigning and voting, but South Korea’s frequent grass-root, bottom-up social 
mobilization efforts that are devoid of propaganda and not government imposed, such as 
those that successfully impeached President Park Geun Hye in 2017, will also seem foreign 
and perplexing. To add to the confusion, a functioning law enforcement and judiciary 
system that does not simultaneously serve as a political loyalty/neighborhood watch 
mechanism will take some time to adjust to and trust. However, it is perfectly reasonable 
to anticipate that over time, as the North Korean refugees realize that South Korea’s 
political and legal systems function to serve its people and allow for greater freedoms, they 
will begin to adjust, conform, and trust South Korea’s political and legal systems.  
Finally, as Koreans on both sides of the border share similar culture, history, food, 
and traditions, it will not be too difficult for the North Korean refugees to meet the fourth 
                                                 
29 Ji Young Sung and Myung Hyun Go, Resettling in South Korea: Challenges for Young North 
Korean Refugees (Seoul, Korea: The ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, August 8, 2014), 2, 
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criterion of understanding Korean traditions. Thus, by all accounts, even if South Korean 
national identity is shaped by civic components, not ethnic, North Korean refugees should 
be able to meet these preconditions and seamlessly assimilate into the South Korean 
society. Yet, discrimination against North Korean defectors and their exclusion from 
mainstream southern society is rather deeply rooted. Kim concurs and emphasizes this: 
Many believe that South Korea welcomes North Korean defectors with 
open arms, taking satisfaction that the oppressive North Korean regime is 
the reason for escape, and feeling above all, that the defectors share the same 
Koreanness ethnically, which is the reason for tendering citizenship as soon 
as they arrive in South Korea. Nonetheless, that underlying principle that 
“we” share the same ethnic origin and unconditionally accept the 
newcomers appears to be under transformation.30 
To further stress this point, a 2015 public opinion studies program led by the ASAN 
Institute indicated a shift in South Korean attitudes towards the acceptance of North Korean 
defectors into southern society. When asked if shared ethnicity was a key factor in 
supporting reunification, only 40.8% of the respondents, mainly those in their 60s and 
older, answered yes.31 This is a fairly perceptible drop from the overall 59.5% of South 
Koreans who, in 2007, felt that shared ethnicity was the main driving factor for 
reunification.32 As Korean society remains wary of shouldering the burden of the potential 
economic costs of reunification, Kim et al. warn that “this decline in the importance of 
ethnic nationalism, if it continues, will undermine of the central tenets of reunification by 
choice, [and] could very well weaken the reunification picture overall.”33 
Of course, ethnic nationalism is still very much relevant to Korean identity. 
However, based on the survey results, a comfortable assumption can be made that civic 
identity is gradually trumping ethnic identity as the determining factor in what it means to 
be Korean. This is to say that if shared ethnic identity has been the main driver and the 
30 Kim J. Y., National Identity and Attitudes Toward North Korean Defectors, 102. 
31 Ji Yoon Kim et al., South Korean Attitudes Toward North Korea and Reunification, Public Opinion 
Studies Program (Seoul, Korea: The ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, February 2015), 34, 
http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-korean-attitudes-toward-north-korea-and-reunification/. 
32 Kim et al., South Korean Attitudes Toward North Korea and Reunification, 35. 
33 Kim et al., South Korean Attitudes Toward North Korea and Reunification, 35. 
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most often cited and emotionally compelling reason for Korean reunification, then the fact 
that an increasing number of South Koreans are rejecting the notion of ethnic nationalism 
as the unifying factor between themselves and North Koreans effectively crumbles the 
justification for pursuing unification in the first place.  
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III. POPULATION MOVEMENT AND MIGRATION
Assuming a scenario post reunification in which South Korea absorbs North Korea 
under relatively peaceful conditions, Koreans on both sides of the border can expect a fairly 
porous movement of people ranging from managed re-settlements to mass migration. After 
all, in the years following the German unification, 2.45 million East Germans migrated to 
West Germany, whereas 1.45 million West Germans moved to the East.34 To put this into 
a broader in perspective, relative to the 1990 German population, the German migration 
flows account for 16.6% of East Germans leaving the East, while only 2.5% of West 
Germans left West Germany.35 In sum, this resulted in a 6% population decline in East 
Germany in the first three years following the German unification.36 
This likely population movement from north to south and vice versa has the 
potential for a myriad of social implications. Whether South Koreans desire it or not, O 
notes that: 
[South Koreans] may find hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of North 
Koreans entering South Korea. North Korea’s continued food shortages, 
dysfunctional economy, and unclear power transition may lead to a situation 
where the mass movement of North Koreans becomes a reality. For South 
Korea to continue to prosper in a relatively stable environment, the smooth 
social integration of North Koreans is a necessity, not a luxury. Examining 
the current challenges that the North Korean defectors face in South Korea 
provides a glimpse of what to expect in the future.37  
In the likely event of a mass North-South migration, the North Korean refugees will crowd 
South Korea’s already hyper-competitive labor market, potentially disproportionally 
disadvantaging the South Koreans workers who already occupy the lower economic strata 
34 Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln and Matthias Schündeln, “Who Stays, Who Goes, Who Returns? East-
West Migration within Germany Since Reunification,” Economics of Transition 14, no. 4 (2009): 704, 
https://doi.org/10.111/j.1468-0351.2009.00373. 
35 Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, “Who Stays, Who Goes, Who Returns?” 704. 
36 Timothy Moss, “Cold Spots of Urban Infrastructure: Shrinking Process in Eastern Germany and the 
Modern Infrastructure Ideal,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32, no. 2 (June 2008): 
437, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2008.00790. 
37 O, “The Integration of North Korean Defectors in South Korea,” 165. 
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of the South Korean population. Additionally, the re-settlement of North Korean refugees 
in an overcrowded Seoul and its surrounding metropolitan areas will further exacerbate 
Seoul’s infrastructure limitations and socio-spatial inequality. In order to best understand 
why population movement and migration is likely post reunification, it is first prudent to 
examine both the motivations behind recent North Korean defections, and the areas in 
which the majority of North Korean defectors have settled since assimilating into South 
Korean society.  
A. NUMBERS, MOTIVATIONS, AND PERCEPTION OF NORTH KOREAN 
DEFECTIONS
As of 2018, there are 32,467 North Korean defectors registered with the Ministry 
of Unification, among which 72% are females. Table 2 shows the steady influx of North 
Korean refugees into South Korea since 1990. Arguably, slightly more than 32,000 people 
in a sea of over 51 million South Koreans constitutes an inconsequential fraction of the 
overall population, presumably not noticeable to make a significant difference. However, 
the generational divergence in the South Korean perception of the North Koreans living 
among them says otherwise.  
Table 2. North Korean Refugees Entering South Korea38 
38 Adapted from the “Policy on North Korean Defectors,” Ministry of Unification, June 2018, 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/. 
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In a 2018 nation-wide opinion poll conducted by the Korean Gallup Daily, 1002 
people from every province of South Korea were asked to state their preferences regarding 
the expediency and timeliness of the Korean reunification. In response to the question, 
“regarding North/South reunification, which do you most prefer among these three options: 
immediate reunification; in 10+ years’ time; or maintain the status quo,” over 21% of those 
aged 40 and over replied immediate reunification, while just 10% of those aged 39 and 
under replied the same.39 About 70% of those 39 and under wished to postpone 
reunification by 10+ years, while only 57% of those 40 and over preferred the same. 
Finally, 18% of both age groups noted their preference for maintaining the status quo.40 
This signals a national trend in the younger generation being more wary and insensitive to 
the possibility of Korean reunification than their older generation counterparts.  
Among the reasons for this generational divergence in perspectives, one key factor 
stands out the most. The North Korean motivations for defecting have shifted rather 
considerably since the 1990s, resulting in a different social composition of North Koreans 
crossing the southern border.41 According to Lankov, pre-famine North Korean defectors 
had political utility. These defectors did not threaten the South Korean identity that is built 
on economic success, a concept that will be further explored in the following chapter, as 
they came from higher echelons of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
society, and possessed more marketable, specialized skills that equipped and prepared them 
for life in a capitalist democracy. The elite defectors of the pre-1990s had “education, social 
skills, and adaptability and could easily find a place for themselves in South Korean 
society” without significant aid from the ROK government.42 These privileged defectors 
often brought with them valuable intelligence, and, consequently, held certain propaganda 
values that could be exploited by the South Korean government to achieve political goals.43  
                                                 
39 “2018 Gallup Korea Daily Opinion Poll,” Gallup Korea, February 22, 2018, www.gallup.co.kr. 
40 Gallup Korea, “2018 Gallup Korea Daily Opinion Poll.” 
41 Lankov, “Bitter Taste of Paradise,” 109–10. 
42 Lankov, “Bitter Taste of Paradise,” 111. 
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Two notable examples of such defectors are Hwang Jang Yop and Lee Han Young. 
Hwang, the highest ranking North Korean defector to seek asylum in South Korea to date, 
was a North Korean politician who was largely credited as being the architect of North 
Korea’s guiding Juche ideology of self-reliance. Hwang defected to South Korea in 1997, 
and until his death in 2010, he collaborated with the ROK government to denounce the 
Pyeongyang regime. Lee Han Young, a nephew of one of Kim Jong Il’s many wives, 
defected to South Korea in 1982 via Switzerland. Lee was an outspoken critic of the Kim 
regime, and worked to deface the Kim family by sharing openly with the media revealing 
stories of Kim Jong Il’s escapades with Lee’s aunt, Song Hye Rim, the mother of recently 
assassinated Kim Jong Nam. Simply put, until the mid-1990s, North Korean defectors 
seeking refuge in South Korea were treated as the high value government assets that they 
effectively were.  
However, the social composition of an average recent North Korean defector is 
markedly different and more representative of what South Korea can expect in the event of 
a complete reunification. Lankov describes that a “typical defector of the early 2000s is an 
impoverished and undereducated farmer from a remote country area, or an under- or 
unemployed worker” with little or no educational background.44 According to the Ministry 
of Unification, out of the 32,467 registered northern defectors, 27,332, or close to 85%, 
were previously unemployed or held jobs as laborers prior to defection.45 Ineptly armed 
with undesirable skills, little education, and no knowledge of the capitalist way of life, most 
recent defectors require substantial government aid, both monetary and vocational, to 
adjust to South Korean society. The majority of the recent defectors are motivated by 
hunger and destitution, meaning they hold little or no political utility for the South. 
Accordingly, the North Korean defectors of the 2000s and beyond are “seen as a social 
burden and a potential irritant in relations with Pyongyang” in the eyes of the South Korean 
public.46 
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This brief overview of the diverging generational perspective with regard to the 
Korean unification highlights the current nation-wide view, especially among the younger 
generation, that unification with the North is not immediately preferable and should be 
postponed. This South Korean sentiment is echoed in a July 1986 German poll in which 
support for the German unification stood at 47% for those between 16–29 years of age, 
56% among those 30–44 years old, 66% for those age 45–59, and 73% for those 60 years 
and older.47 
This thesis does not seek to further analyze the root cause of this generational gap, 
nor claim that this negative perception will make South Korea less likely to pursue 
unification in the first place. By all accounts, the unification of the Korean peninsula 
implies a radical change in context that might change how the South Korean citizens and 
the ROK government feel about and behave towards North Koreans. This is to say that in 
the event of reunification, North Korean migrants will not be defectors anymore, no longer 
making up a second-thought, inconsequential minority proportion of the South Korean 
society. Arguably, the entire country of former-South Korea will be mobilized, willingly 
or not, to deal with the impending social repercussions of merging the two Korean 
societies. Thus, it would be reasonable to claim that when faced with imminent social 
churn, South Korea will expand its existing policies and develop new strategies to deal 
more squarely with the social integration of North Koreans into the South Korean society.  
On the other hand, based on the fact that former East and West Germany have yet 
to achieve complete social parity, and also having requisite knowledge of the wealth-and-
status defined nature of South Korean society, this thesis takes the pessimistic view that 
the social backlash from accommodating northern refugees will likely prove to be 
prohibitively challenging. While it is fair to predict a national mobilization in face of full-
fledged unification, this thesis suggests an alternative scenario in which the current 
negative defector perception will simply be multiplied and intensified upon unification. If 
mere 32,000 Northerners living among 51 million Southerners can form this, generously 
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put, unfriendly perception, then it would make a certain amount of sense that the social 
implications of a full-fledged North/South reunification would require a massive 
undertaking and prove to be exceptionally challenging for both parties involved.  
B. RE-SETTLEMENT OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES IN SOUTH 
KOREA 
The population density in South Korea speaks volumes at 509 persons/km².48 It is 
one of the densest countries in the world, and when ranked against other East Asian 
developed nations, Japan and Philippines are only 70% as densely populated as South 
Korea. In a country slightly larger than the state of Indiana, Seoul is arguably the largest, 
most populous, and the sole major metropolis of South Korea. South Korea’s 
“unprecedentedly rapid” urbanization has created satellite cities that are heavily dependent 
on Seoul for the job market, commutability, and other economically related activities.49 
Due to South Korea’s compressed economic growth in which its rate of urbanization since 
1950 has surpassed that of other developing nations by almost five-fold, Kang observes  
that “the problem of urban concentration around the capital city of Seoul has been acute in 
the formation of urban space.”50  
Nearly all central infrastructure of South Korean politics, economy, and society—
government buildings, top companies, best schools, cultural centers, law firms, publishers, 
hospitals and many more—is headquartered in Seoul. This is significant to note for two 
reasons. First, due to such a heavy centralization in Seoul, competition is fierce to obtain 
everything from an entry-level job to entrance to schools, or even an apartment. As such, 
internal South Korean migration into Seoul is heavy with job-, education-, and housing-
seekers with no ties to the city, which has contributed to job competition, housing shortage, 
environmental pollution, and nightmarish traffic congestion. Second, with South Korea 
reaching almost 82% urbanization, Seoul has increasingly become the hub of South Korean 
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entrepreneurship.51 Accordingly, Seoul’s population—10.2 million within city limits and 
25.6 million within the immediate surrounding metropolitan areas—encompasses slightly 
more than 50% of the entire country’s population.52 The Capital Region (CR), as Seoul 
and its surrounding metropolitan areas are commonly called, accounts for only 11.8% of 
the South Korean territory, yet 47.1% of South Korea’s total number of employment 
firms.53  
The centralized nature of South Korean society already makes Seoul a magnet for 
South and North Koreans alike. Due to the competitive and one-golden-track nature of the 
southern culture and education system, it is common knowledge that the best, the brightest, 
and the richest members of the South Korean society concentrate in the nation’s capital. 
For the majority who cannot afford the hefty price tag of living in Seoul proper, numerous 
satellite cities and surrounding suburbs have exploded in the past decade to accommodate 
the nearly 50% of the entire South Korean population that resides in the CR. This is to say 
that the rich and the poor alike flock towards the nation’s capital as everyone wants to be 
in, near, or around Seoul for its top feeder schools and universities, greater job 
opportunities—of the top 10 Korean chaebols, only one was headquartered outside of 
Seoul proper but still within the Gyeonggi province—more varied options for housing, ease 
of access to public transits, entrepreneurship opportunities, and centrality to pop culture, 
food, art, fashion, and recreational activities.  
Accordingly, the Ministry of Unification’s re-settlement data shows that 60% of all 
North Korean defectors choose to re-settle in or near Seoul. Furthermore, just as it was the 
case when Berlin’s proximity to Brandenburg, a former-East German Länder (province), 
“consistently attracted more East-West migrants” than other Western German provinces,54 
South Korea can anticipate an even bigger influx of migrants into its capital due to Seoul’s 
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close proximity to the North Korean border. In this regard, Noland further emphasizes that 
“given the proximity of Seoul to the border, it is hard to imagine that [the] Korean 
unification would be accompanied by insufficient southward migration.”55  
Of course, upon unification, the South Korean government may encourage, or even 
require, a more dispersed settlement pattern among the North Korean migrants. However, 
if the German reunification sheds any light into Korea’s prospects, it is that economic 
stability and employment prospects drive migration patterns.56 Due to the centralized 
nature of the South Korean society, and the dearth of variation in its economic centers, 
there is only one other city in South Korea, Busan, that even begins to compare to Seoul in 
terms of economic strength and infrastructure support. For these reasons, and based on the 
current defector re-settlement trends, it is logical to predict that just like their South Korean 
counterparts who seek the big city prospects and the thrill and excitement of Seoul, North 
Korean migrants will flock to the Capital Region as well. 
There are two main social implications of a mass North-South migratory movement 
of North Korean refugees. First, unemployed Northerners flocking south seeking jobs will 
inevitably crowd the competitive labor market of not just Seoul, but of South Korea as a 
whole. Unfortunately, this will mainly disenfranchise the already disadvantaged South 
Korean unskilled laborers, and prove to be a slighter annoyance to the South Korean elites. 
Specific to Seoul and the Gyeonggi province, the re-settlement of North Korean refugees 
in an already overcrowded capital will threaten Seoul’s basic and critical infrastructures, 
exacerbate Seoul’s socio-spatial inequality, and deepen the social division of inner city 
neighborhoods and suburbs.  
1. Labor-Crowding Effect  
In terms of the labor-crowding effect, North Korean migration into South Korea 
will heighten job competition within the already disadvantaged, lower economic strata of 
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the South Korean population. Bidet directly addresses how the “recent massive influx of 
North Korean defectors from low social classes has made their work integration in South 
Korea a worrisome issue.”57 Surprisingly, despite its recent accumulation of wealth, South 
Korea still has the “lowest proportion of regular salaried workers among OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries and a labor market 
that is characterized by growing bipolarization between secured [primary] and unsecured 
[secondary] jobs.”58 Irrespective of its lowest unemployment rate among OECD nations, 
“the proportion of non-salaried workers is more than 45 percent of all salaried workers 
[compared to 24 percent in the U.S.],” and makes up one third of the entire South Korean 
labor force.59 
One might presume that since what the North Korean laborers bring to the table are 
skill sets that the majority of highly educated South Koreans eschew in the first place, 
competition will be minimal within the low-value labor sector. And until the 1990s, this 
was the case as work integration of North Korean defectors into the South Korean labor 
market did not pose a big challenge due to three main reasons.60 First, only a small, thus 
manageable stream of defectors trickled into South Korea in the first forty years following 
the separation. As an example, in 1988 the entire population of northern defectors living in 
South Korea remained just under 600; this number has drastically increased to almost 
33,000 today.61 Second, those who defected prior to the mid-1990s were skilled workers 
and members of elite social groups (i.e., diplomats, businessmen, or military officers) with 
translatable skills.62 Lastly, their motivations for defection were ideological, not 
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economic.63 Under these favorable conditions, the pre-1990s defectors were well-accepted 
and widely regarded as valuable assets.  
However, changes in the defector population’s composition since the 2000s, with 
the arrival of more North Korean families, more women defectors than men, and 
differences in social and economic origins, have led the realistic skill level of an average 
North Korean migrant to be in the low-value, manufacturing sector. Consequently, it will 
not be the above-average South Korean worker in the South’s dominant service industry 
who will compete with the newly arrived northern migrants. Rather, it will be the below-
average South Korean workers—rural workers, farmers, merchants, factory workers, and 
laborers—precisely those Southerners who are already on the lower end of the labor market 
spectrum, who will find themselves in competition, and perhaps becoming even more 
disenfranchised as North Korean refugees prove more willing to work for lower wages in 
harsher, more grueling conditions. Thus, the “influx of migrants without any working 
experience or experience only in non-professional areas makes a priori their work 
integration all the more problematic” with respect to competition with the southern non-
salaried workers.64  
Table 3 shows North Korean defectors categorized by their professional 
backgrounds prior to defection. Data shows that an overwhelming majority of North 
Korean defectors—85% of the sample—were either unemployed or held jobs as unskilled 
workers in their previous life.65 This is highly representative of North Korea’s current labor 
force distribution by occupation, which according to the Central Intelligence Agency, 
estimates that 37% of North Koreans are engaged in agriculture while 63% are employed 
in industries; it is believed that a negligible percentage of the DPRK population is part of 
the services labor force.66 Furthermore, it is likely that 25–26% of the North Korean 
population is unemployed.  
                                                 
63 Bidet, “Social Capital and Work Integration of Migrants,” 155. 
64 Bidet, “Social Capital and Work Integration of Migrants,” 158. 
65 Ministry of Unification, “Policy of North Korean Defectors.” 
66 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook.” 
27 




Contrastingly, South Korea’s labor force distribution places the majority of the 
Southerners, 70%, in the services sector, with 25% involved in industries and a minority 
5% working in the agriculture sector.68 In the event of mass North-South population 
movement, the South will find it challenging to cope with not only the sudden competition 
for limited jobs in its agriculture and industry labor sectors, but, more importantly, it will 
also find that its citizens who are already occupying the lower class of southern society will 
feel the brunt of the competition. Of course, not all North Koreans will relocate to 
metropolitan hubs for employment, but for those that do, the competition will be fierce 
between these two groups of Koreans.  
For those northern refugees that do venture outside the capital into the more rural 
areas, employment prospects may be more promising. Interestingly enough, the potential 
North-South migration and the sudden increase in unspecialized labor may not signal all 
bad news for South Korea. In fact, it may even help relieve some of the pressures of South 
Korea’s overall labor shortage that the country has felt since the late 1990s. This void is 
predominantly in the low-productivity, low-skill labor market, which has subsequently 
been filled by foreign migrants from Southeast Asia. Projections from the 2019 OECD 
report on the status of South Korea’s recruitment of immigrant workers estimates the 
largest jump in old-age dependency ratio between 2015 and 2060. This means that the 
proportion of South Korea’s working-age population will decrease from 73% in 2013 to 
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53% by 2030 and even further to 50% by 2060.69 Concurrent with the decline in working-
age population is the rapidly aging population that is expected to comprise 40% of the 
overall South Korean population by 2060, while the new generation of workers—those 
under 15—will make up a scant 10%.70 Further compounding this issue is the 
unprecedentedly highly educated youth who are unwilling to take low-skilled jobs, thus 
leaving a large vacancy of 700,000 jobs in the low-value chain of small and 
microenterprises (SMEs) in 2017.71 The 2019 OECD report states that the “changing 
educational composition of the working age population has not meant the disappearance of 
low-productivity, low-wage jobs.”72 Thus, these low-quality jobs, typically characterized 
by low wages, poor promotion and future employment prospects, and poor working 
conditions, have been filled by foreign workers recruited from poorer Southeast Asian 
nations.73  
To date, South Korea has published three “Basic Plans for Immigration Policies”; 
the first in 2008, the second in 2013, and the latest in 2018. Each plan seeks to 
systematically control and centralize South Korea’s immigration policies, and establish a 
long-term plan to enhance Korea’s multiculturalism, while maintaining its global 
competitiveness.74 While the latest plan recognized the “growing role of the foreign 
workforce and the increasing share of immigrants in the Korean population, [the plan still] 
reflected policy objectives to reduce the proportion of low-skilled workers, and [instead,] 
attract higher-wage, higher skill migrants.”75 In the event of a mass North-South migration 
post-unification, the North Korean refugees could certainly fill this void. In doing so, 
perhaps the homogeneous South Korean population that is historically resistant to foreign 
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immigration may become more receptive to the migration of ethnic North Koreans to fill 
the labor shortage in the low-value sectors that would better match the skill and education 
level of an average northern refugee.  
For the southern elites who occupy the upper echelons of South Korea’s society, 
competition stemming from the migration of northern refugees will manifest itself in a 
variety of other ways. Certainly, the average northern refugee will not be competing with 
these elite members for similar jobs or housing. However, even the southern elites will 
have to make concessions to accommodate the new arrivals. The most recent example of 
such compromises was seen during the 2018 Pyeongchang Olympics, when the political 
decision to compete under a unified ice hockey team ousted 12 South Korean hockey 
players—who had rightfully and competitively earned their spot on the Olympic team—in 
order to accommodate 12 North Korean hockey players.  
Other ways in which the South’s best and the brightest could be affected are through 
targeted government intervention policies that would change and/or lower the standard for 
North Korean refugees. This could be in the form of suneung shiyeom (College Scholastic 
Ability Test) exemption for North Koreans wishing to pursue higher education, or simply 
the expansion of the existing Special Admission for Expatriates Act, which offers North 
Korean defectors admission to prestigious South Korean universities on a non-competitive 
basis.76 The ROK government also currently gives “convenience store contract priority to 
defector-owned business within public facilities, [and] subsidizes half of the defectors’ 
monthly wages for two years to encourage South Korean companies to hire defectors.”77 
The continuation and potential expansion of these monetary aid or special favors programs 
for North Korean entrepreneurs, as well as employment and college acceptance quotas that 
mandate hiring and admission of less qualified North Korean candidates despite the 
prevalence of more qualified South Korean candidates, will likely cause social friction 
among the South Korean elites.  
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To be fair, not all North Korean refugees will be low-skill laborers. It is estimated 
that 25% of the northern population belongs to the core class of North Korean society—a 
sizeable portion, which, according to the RAND Corporation, encompasses 4.4 million 
adults.78 If the German reunification provides any insight into the migratory patterns of 
educated elites, it is that higher educational background was a strong positive predictor of 
East-West migration.79 As young, vocationally trained, and/or college-educated East 
Germans migrated West at a much higher proportion after 1998, East Germany felt a net 
loss of its most productive group, and subsequently experienced a “brain drain” of its best 
and brightest leaving the East while the members of its lowest social group remained 
behind.80 This in turn reflects what Fuchs-Schündeln notes are “low expectations for future 
economic convergence between the two parts of Germany,”81 and could potentially 
explain what Lang deems shrinkage and peripheralization of East Germany at the cost of 
Western metropolization. 
Post-unification, the northern elites will surely seek employment. Gathering from 
their professional qualifications, and a “strong sense of distinction between white collar 
and blue collar labor” that they bring with them, O notes that when given a choice, North 
Koreans “prefer white collar jobs, while eschewing blue collar work.”82 In this case, the 
southern elites will be competing with equally well-educated and skilled candidates in an 
already hyper-competitive labor market, which is bound to cause social churn and 
widespread discontent. Nevertheless, whether it is a manual laborer of the hostile class or 
a Pyongyang University graduate well-versed in computer engineering, the mass migration 
of northern refugees seeking employment in the southern economy will be met with some 
resistance. If current trends hold, which this thesis suspects they will, northern refugees 
migrating to South Korea will face the resentment of a small margin of unemployed 
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southern workers, biased hiring managers, dissatisfied and stressed southern students 
seeking entrance to a selective few prestigious universities, and angry capitalists who will 
feel threatened by the new competition of the northern entrepreneurs.  
2. Infrastructure Limitations and Socio-Spatial Inequality
Migration of North Koreans into Seoul will over-capacitate the capital’s basic 
infrastructure systems and exacerbate the city’s existing socio-spatial inequality unless the 
South Korean government develops policies to augment its smaller metropolitan cities by 
encouraging infrastructure building, entrepreneur development, and permanent relocation 
of South Korea’s chaebol headquarters out of Seoul. It cannot be emphasized enough the 
over-dominance of Seoul as the sole South Korean hub for culture, entertainment, finance, 
business, and politics. Perhaps the most ambitious and costly initiative to tackle Seoul’s 
over-taxed infrastructure and overcrowding issue was a 2004 proposition to “relocate the 
capital and make the country less Seoul-centric.”83 Named the Sejong Special 
Autonomous City in honor of the father of the Korean alphabet and the revered King of the 
Joseon Dynasty, Sejong City began as a campaign promise by President Roh Moo Hyun 
who envisioned creating a center of government “similar to Washington, D.C., while 
leaving Seoul as a business [and] financial capital equivalent to New York.”84  
Though the city was officially established in 2014, intervention by the South 
Korean constitutional court and political in-fighting has brought more failures than 
successes to the new city. While, to date, 36 government ministries call Sejong City home, 
the movement of the governing function out of Seoul has not led to the subsequent 
movement of private enterprises, businesses, schools, and other community enriching 
features of a self-sustaining city into Sejong. In addition, due to the centrality of better 
schools and tutoring centers available in Seoul, the majority of the city’s 280,000 
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population are made up of public servants who often either leave their families behind in 
the capital, or commute 75 miles from Seoul—certainly not the intent of the government’s 
relocation.  
Meanwhile, Seoul and its surrounding Capital Region are not seeing meaningful 
decreases in its population size, and “concerns about the overly dominant national role of 
the capital—the Seoul metropolitan area accounts for nearly half of the country’s gross 
domestic product—in line with growing pressure for a more even distribution of national 
wealth” continues to grow.85 Kang supplements further that given the trend that “the 
problems of the capital cities are not being solved, but are being diffused into the 
surrounding urban areas,” an influx of more people into an already overcrowded space 
could result in the North Koreans being pushed to Seoul’s periphery, and the potential 
mushrooming of Seoul’s satellite cities.86   
This situation would only be made worse by an influx of North Korean migration, 
as there would be an inadequate supply of public goods, infrastructure, and resources to 
accommodate the new migrants. Consequently, all those living in the capital region, with 
the slight exception of those in the wealthiest neighborhoods, would be affected in the 
event of a North Korean migration, as they would be forced to compete even more for the 
already limited schools, hospitals, housing, transportation, and water and power supplies 
against their northern counterparts. Understandably, this competition is bound to meet 
resistance and cause widespread annoyance, if not discontent, among South Koreans who 
may feel more entitled to live in “their” Seoul than the “foreign” North Koreans. On this 
point, Kim observes that the concentration of North Korean refugees in Seoul is increasing 
due to the common belief that the “densely populated districts of the National Capital 
Region hold vast opportunities to earn money.”87 In terms of supply and demand for 
Seoul’s infrastructure then, this northern desire to settle in Seoul and its environs signals 
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problems for Seoul’s limited housing supply that stems from the prohibitively high cost of 
land.88 Similarly, Ha concurs that despite South Korea’s miraculous economic 
performance, “the Korean [urban] housing situation has experienced serious problems” 
since the 1980s.89 She further notes that “given the great shortage of housing, owner-
occupation has declined, rented tenure has become more common, and overcrowding has 
become endemic.”90 
Table 4 shows North Korean defector re-settlement in South Korea by region. 
According to this data from the Ministry of Unification, 7,020 defectors re-settled in Seoul 
city proper, 9,522 defectors established roots in Gyeonggi-do—the most populous province 
in South Korea that surrounds the capital city—and 2,807 North Koreans migrated to the 
city of Incheon, the third most populous South Korean city that is located just 15 miles 
outside of Seoul.91 In sum, this accounts for 19,349 defectors among 32,467 registered 
North Koreans residing in South Korea, meaning, 60% of all North Korean defectors chose 
to re-settle in or near Seoul—one of the densest, most overcrowded cities in the world that 
is already struggling to stretch its infrastructure to meet the needs of the growing 
population.  
Table 4. North Korean Defector Settlement By Region92 
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It is not just a shortage of housing or the heightened competition for jobs, however, 
that will complicate the social integration of North Korean refugees into Seoul. At a macro-
level, the potential, and highly likely, projection of social disparity between the Northerners 
and the Southerners into spatial inequality within Seoul should be a cause for greater 
concern. Arguably, socio-spatial inequality already exists not just in Seoul or within the 
Capital Region, but across the country as a whole. This phenomenon is certainly not 
exclusive to South Korea. According to the Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
(Statistisches Bundesamt), out of Germany’s 82 million population in 2018, only 15 
million, or 18%, live in the former eastern German provinces.93 Nearly thirty years after 
the German unification, East Germans continue to have statistically higher probability of 
living below the poverty line, experience poorer health, and have productivity levels only 
67% that of their western counterparts. Furthermore, inequalities in both educational and 
employment opportunities exist between the two Germanys, contributing to what Moss 
notes as the overall population and economic shrinkage of East German cities since the 
1990s—east German cities Hoyerswerda, Schwerin, and Halle saw 29%, 21%, and 21% 
population declines respectively.94 To contextualize this even further, out of the top 10 
most valuable German companies in terms of contribution to the national GDP, not a single 
one is presently headquartered in former East German provinces.  
What is particular about South Korea’s socio-spatial inequality is that South 
Korea’s rapid economic growth and government directed industrial restructuring has led to 
a rather sharp social cleavage between the haves and the have nots. According to Kang, the 
Gross Regional Domestic Product of South Korea’s two largest metropolitan hubs—Seoul 
and its surrounding province Gyeonggi, and Busan and its surrounding province 
Gyeongsan—make up 60.4% of the national GDP.95 Figures such as these indicate an 
almost singular concentration of jobs, people, infrastructure, housing, and government 
93 “German Population,” Statistiches Bundesamt, 2018, 
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services in just two parts of the country. Furthermore, pork barrel politics at the executive 
branch level also exacerbates South Korea’s socio-spatial inequality.  
South Korean presidents have historically been accused of imparting favoritism on 
their hometowns, and funneling disproportionate amount of government funds to 
Gyeongsan Province after being elected into office. Since its transition to democracy in the 
1980s, six out of South Korea’s eight presidents have hailed from Gyeongsan Province, a 
southeastern province of South Korea where they country’s second largest city, Busan, is 
located. Thus, it is no mere coincidence that the only other part of South Korea that is as 
comparably developed as Seoul, is precisely the hometown province of the majority of the 
past South Korean presidents. The tendency of South Korean presidents to practice pork-
barrel politics has led to an uneven infrastructure development across the country. For 
example, Jeolla (southwest) and Gangwon (northeast) provinces hold the majority of rural 
South Korean jobs, remain sparsely developed, and are nowhere near the advanced and 
progressive infrastructure level of Gyeonggi (northwest) and Gyeongsan (southeast) 
provinces. Thus, the conclusion reached by the majority of North Korean defectors, who 
flock to Seoul based on what Kim notes is the common belief that the “densely populated 
districts of the National Capital Region hold vast opportunities to earn money,” is not all 
that incorrect.96  
The potential for Seoul’s socio-spatial inequality is exacerbated by the city’s 
existing infrastructure limitations even without the future influx of North-South migration. 
According to a World Health Organization report, “although the population and 
automobiles in Seoul accounting for a greater percentage of figures in Korea made traffic 
increase heavily, there is a limit to providing [more] roads to accommodate.” 97 Aside from 
traffic congestion, the resultant air pollution and health effects have become an issue that 
must be resolved not only to improve quality of life, but also to sustain the city’s 
competitiveness. Should reunification instigate migration of North Koreans into the capital, 
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Seoul, a city that is already threatening to burst at the seams, will struggle to cope with a 
sudden population increase. Certainly, reunification could be just the spark that is needed 
to squarely address Seoul’s infrastructure limitations and growing socio-spatial inequality. 
However, the current limited urban space does not leave much room for further 
infrastructure development; the current housing crisis will not get better with more people 
seeking urban housing, especially when lacking the land space to build more housing; and 
more people seeking private car ownership or using public transportation will not alleviate 
congestion or improve Seoul’s air quality. By all accounts, it seems that Seoul is at or very 
near its maximum capacity. In preparation for potential unification, polices to stagger and/
or limit population movement into the capital, and more programs like the 2004 Sejong 
City initiative seem necessary for a managed and peaceful integration of the two Korean 
societies.  
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IV. DISCRIMINATION AND EMERGENCE OF A CLASS SYSTEM 
The following sections argue that conflicting values and stark differences in societal 
norms make it prohibitively challenging for North Koreans to assimilate into South Korea’s 
modern, fast-paced, success-crazed, and materialistic society. Section A measures the 
growing social distance between the two Korean societies that is intensified by the split of 
pan-Korean nationalism into two separate northern and southern national identities. 
Section B elaborates on the divergence of cultural and societal values that further 
contributes to the widening social distance between North and South Koreans. This section 
relies on defector accounts and references education data to highlight the social 
discrimination issues among defector teens in South Korea’s school environment. It also 
addresses rampant labor market discrimination against defectors that, more often than not, 
subjugates North Koreans to dirty, difficult, and dangerous (3D) secondary market jobs.  
A. THE SPLIT OF PAN-KOREAN NATIONALISM AND GROWING 
SOCIAL DISTANCE 
National identity plays a determinant role in policy making. Accordingly, if one 
clear national identity exists within a country, then it becomes much easier to forge an 
agreeable one-track policy that reflects the nation’s identity. However, the key issue with 
the Korean peninsula is that pan-Korean nationalism has sharply diverged into two factions 
of South Korean “Us” versus a North Korean “Them.” Furthermore, contrasting values 
shaped by this split national identity contributes to the stark cultural differences between 
North and South Korea. Despite the official party line of “Woorinen Hana, We are One,” 
2007 research shows that “South Koreans felt a great deal of social distance towards North 
Korean refugees.”98 Mistrust and foreignness that undercut kinship and ethnic ties are the 
primary reasons for this negative sentiment, and this divergence in national identity could 
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be a harbinger for systematic discrimination and emergence of a new class system in the 
event of Korean reunification.  
National identity is forged when members of a society collectively undergo similar 
experiences, successes, and failures. Millard states that the “evolution of vastly different 
identities on the Peninsula has caused an almost irreparable social divide.”99 While 
economic success and capitalism shaped South Korea’s identity, economic hardship and 
the pursuit of nuclear weapons gave rise to a wholly different northern identity. To clarify 
further, the South Korean national identity is synonymous with its membership as one of 
the “Four Asian Tigers,” or its moniker as the “Miracle on the Han River,” both referencing 
South Korea’s rapid and sustained economic success. On the other hand, the uniting factor 
of North Korea’s national identity has been the Kim family dynasty. This difference in 
national identity has evolved to create two opposing societies in which the northern and 
southern ideologies, so crucial to the development of their respective national identities, 
likely cannot co-exist.  
Post-reunification, the Northerners will be pressed to shed juche ideology and 
embrace the South’s capitalist ideals. This transition has proven to be rather problematic 
among newly arrived defectors, who are often at a complete loss in finding a new identity 
once reaching South Korea. In the DPRK, all North Koreans are officially made to share 
the same identity as a comrade, someone who was more than likely born and raised in the 
same village, and surrounded by the same people with whom they live and work. In South 
Korea, however, as they are forced to shed this conformist northern identity through the 
rehabilitation process at the Hana Center, North Korean defectors struggle to come to terms 
with the lies, myths, embellishments, and defamations that previously defined their North 
Korean identity. This is not to say that North Koreans will never shed their old identity; 
however, the divergence of the two Korean governance systems and identities is fast 
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“reaching a point where the two paths may not be able to re-converge” under peaceful 
terms.100  
South of the DMZ, North Koreans are often referred to by the government and the 
media as saeteomin (or “new settlers”), defectors, and/or refugees, all fairly vague and 
broad terms that are meant to be politically correct. More colloquially, however, depending 
on the situation and personal feelings, they are called brothers, traitors, immigrants, low- 
class, or just simply, “not one of us.” This further confuses the newly arrived Northerners 
as to where they belong in the southern society. Are they no different from every other 
immigrant? Do they deserve special treatment and political asylum based on a shared ethnic 
lineage? Are they traitors to their country, or should they be hailed as heroes for 
overcoming such odds to reach safety? More often than not, according to the 2016 
Unification Perception Survey, North Korean defectors are considered “second class 
citizens who form a new minority group in South Korean society.”101  
The biggest issue, then, is the potential for this negative sentiment to multiply and 
intensify upon unification. Certainly, full-fledged unification will put South Koreans in 
closer proximity to North Koreans. And with this greater degree of personal interaction, 
Northerners living amongst the Southerners will become the new norm, and the current 
rejection of North Koreans as second class citizens could fade away. However, if the 
German example foreshadows Korea’s future prospects, this thesis does not find that 
scenario likely. In fact, while “the German economy is considered as the driver of the 
European Union, [the] social divide that was forged over the decades is far from recovered 
and the social distance remains relatively high.”102 To this day, the despite the high levels 
of internal East-West migration following the German unification, “only 4% of all 
marriages in Germany are mixed marriages of people coming from the east and the west 
of the country.”103 Despite being integrated for thirty years and economically thriving, 
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Zawilska-Florczuk and Ciechanowics sadly conclude that “differences in everyday culture 
or slight differences in behavior [continue to] give rise to the sense of distinctness, the 
‘mental wall’, and the collection of stereotypes” among East and West Germans.104 
Son further examines this problematic defector re-settlement identity crisis by 
arguing that the Korean reunification is much more than just the merging of the peninsula. 
Rather, it is a multi-dimensional undertaking that involves fusing the two Korean psyches 
into a single national identity.105 She notes that “the South Korea of today is vastly 
different from that of the immediate post-division period, and the passing of time and 
generational change have facilitated the adoption of norms and developments of varying 
origin that have fundamentally transformed both the state and [the] society.”106 
Consequently, this has contributed to the divergence of once pan-Korean nationalism into 
a South Korean “Self” and North Korean “Other.”107  
Son argues that “the presence of North Koreans in [southern] society…has come to 
pose a threat to what theorists describe as ‘societal security’ of the South as an independent 
state, different economically, socially, and politically from the North in a great many 
ways.”108 This argument has merit and aptly explains the lack of closeness that South 
Koreans feel towards the North Korean defectors, because a sudden influx of North Korean 
defectors will threaten the South Korean national identity that is defined by economic 
success. This fear is verbalized in the 2016 Unification Perception Survey, where the 
“increasing immigrant numbers—including North Korean defectors—have led to fears that 
this will [have] a negative impact on the distribution of resources away from existing 
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members of society.”109 Simply put, just as North Koreans struggle to take on a new 
southern identity free from communist teachings and un-constricted by songbun,110 an 
elaborate and hereditary North Korean social classification system, South Koreans feel 
threatened by the growing number of North Korean defectors challenging the very core of 
the South Korean identity—economic success and wealth.  
Kim and Jang argue that saeteomin, translated as “new settlers,” “reflect different 
and unequal citizenship status and a divisive identity of Korean nationalism.”111 They 
further claim that while current South Korean defector policy addresses the economic 
aspects of North Korean re-settlement, it does not adequately address the emotional factors, 
such as identity, discrimination, and social distance, that are crucial to successful social 
assimilation. This de facto second-class citizenship status is best represented through 
examples that expose the differences in culture and societal values, and lay bare the 
rampant social and labor market discrimination that perpetually disadvantages the North 
Koreans. 
The clearest representation of this divergence in Korean national identity can be 
drawn from the results of the 2016 Unification Perception Survey conducted by the 
Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at the Seoul National University. This survey 
meticulously documents the South Korean perception of unification and southern attitudes 
toward North Korea. It also provides an in-depth analysis of the social integration of North 
Korean defectors and South Korean receptiveness to multiculturalism. The results 
conclude that “social distance toward North Korean defectors had increased compared to 
before, and more respondents are reluctant to accept North Koreans into South Korean 
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society...‘selective acceptance’ now seems to represent South Korean social 
attitudes toward North Korean defectors and migrants.”112  
To better elaborate on the subject of selective acceptance, Kim compares the results 
of two East Asia Institute surveys conducted in 2005 and 2010 on South Korea’s 
acceptance of North Korean defectors. As shown in Table 5, while in 2005, nearly 50% of 
the interviewees responded that North Korean defectors should be unconditionally 
accepted into South Korea because they are Koreans, this percentage dropped to 38.1% in 
2010, indicating a change in the South Korean attitude toward the acceptance of North 
Koreans into their society.113 By 2010, the majority of South Koreans felt that South Korea 
should only accept North Koreans on a conditional basis depending on the defector’s 
economic and/or diplomatic situation.114 
Table 5. Acceptance of North Korean Defectors115 
To measure the degree of social distance that South Koreans feel toward their 
northern counterparts, the 2016 Unification Perception Survey used a 5-point scale to 
gauge South Koreans’ “sense of closeness” toward North Korean defectors living in South 
Korea. The findings are broken down into age groups in Table 6 to specifically stress that 
social distance South Koreans feel toward North Korean refugees transcends all age 
groups. While southern support for unification shows a clear generational divergence, with 
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younger generations less in favor than older generations,116 when it comes to the growing 
social distance between North and South Koreans, the survey suggests that a general 
consensus exists among the southern population that North Koreans are, in fact, foreigners 
and outsiders. When asked how close they felt to the North Korean defectors, 29% of all 
respondents replied positively saying that they felt close; 27.3% responded negatively, 
saying that they did not; and 43.7% gave a neutral response.117 This is to say that 71% of 
all South Koreans either gave noncommittal responses or felt no sense closeness at all 
towards the defectors who have been living amongst them for several decades.  
Table 6. South Koreans’ Sense of Closeness to North Korean 
Defectors by Age118 
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To be fair, this lack of closeness or feelings of apathy towards low-skilled, 
economically motivated migrants is hardly exclusive to South Korea. Japan is notoriously 
homogenous, with one of the consistently lowest immigration rates among OECD 
countries; and one of the main platforms upon which pro-Brexit advocates campaigned for 
Britain’s departure from the European Union was stronger immigration policies to restrict 
the inflow of Middle Eastern refugees. As it relates to reunification, Zawilska-Florczuk 
and Ciechanowics’ conclusion that “the contact of the two [German] societies in many 
cases resulted in culture shock, which finally revealed the distance between them” seems 
particularly germane to the Korean case. In fact, according to a survey conducted in 2005, 
most former-East German residents believed that German “reunification and the changes 
it has entailed have brought them more losses than benefits.”119 As early as 1992, 70% of 
East Germans believed that they were more different than similar from West Germans, 
while 52% of West Germans felt the same.120 Seventeen years later in 2009, this social 
distance had narrowed only marginally, and 63% of East Germans saw more differences 
than similarities when they compared themselves to West Germans, and 42% of West 
Germans felt the same.121  
Even more telling is the 2005 survey result conducted by Allenbacher Umfrage in 
which respondents were asked to identify in what terms, precisely, the residents of eastern 
and western Germany are different. The results of this survey are summarized in Table 7, 
but collectively, both groups were able to identify 22 categories in which residents of old 
federal states (i.e., former-West Germans) and residents of new federal states (i.e., former-
East Germans) were different from each other122 Just as present day South Koreans across 
all age groups feel a great degree of social distance towards their northern counterparts, in 
post-reunified Germany, the dichotomy of ‘us versus them’ was reinforced through a 
number of stereotypes123 Three decades have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, yet 
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a “mental wall” between the two German states has “weakened insignificantly and [is] still 
part of the opinion many Germans share.”124  
Table 7. Categorization of Differences: Responses to the Question, 
“In What Terms, Precisely, are Residents of Eastern and Western Germany 
Different from One Another?”125 
 
 
B. CULTURE AND SOCIETAL VALUES 
It is impossible to know for certain what North Koreans value. However, through 
deduction, it is possible to reason that their socialist society has conditioned North Koreans 
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to value community closeness and loyalty to the state, all the while encouraging an 
underlying instinctual level of mistrust and secrecy. Yet, despite the hardship in this 
“impossible state,” North Koreans still believe that they are the chosen people.126 At first, 
it is incredibly difficult to comprehend such a radical belief. However, the fundamental 
differences in nation building post-Korean War, coupled with the integral role of the state 
in the formation of a national identity, have caused North Koreans to struggle to assimilate 
into any society that is not defined by the Kim dynasty.127 Knowing this, it is a bit clearer 
to see why North Korean defectors currently living in South Korea struggle to integrate 
and accept the South Korean national identity as their own. South Korean national identity 
is heavily intertwined with its economic success. As a result, South Korean society is 
particularly sensitive to, and greatly values, wealth, status, and material goods. This is 
evident in the growing number of women receiving plastic surgeries, the booming cosmetic 
market, and in South Korea’s culture of gift giving—more or less systematic bribery guised 
under a gift giving culture known as chonji.128  
South Korea’s culture of chonji is often perceived as essential to thrive and “win” 
in a hyper-competitive southern education system. Pressured by this culture, parents often 
send their children to school with envelopes filled with cash to solicit better grades or 
evaluations from the teachers. On National Teacher Appreciation Day, one mother of an 
elementary school student offered 500,000 won ($500 USD) to her child’s teacher. When 
asked why she chose to do so, she replied, “I couldn’t help it. I am a mother, and I don’t 
want my child to be subject to disadvantages because I had not offered chonji.”129 But this 
culture transcends the classroom and manifests itself in almost every aspect of South 
Korean society, including even the ROK military. Employees seeking promotion often 
disperse cash envelopes or extravagant gifts, and a former corporate lawyer confessed to 
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doling out tens of thousands of dollars in ostensible chonji gifts to public prosecutors on 
behalf of the Samsung Family Group.130  
This chonji culture is exacerbated by the value that South Koreans place on getting 
into the right school, which leads to the right job, which allows one to find the right 
marriage partner. In such an extreme society with values that diverge so distinctly from 
that of the North Koreans, who have relied on the state to make every education and 
employment decision, it is reasonable to conclude that the majority of North Korean 
defectors who cannot afford chonji will be short-changed. This particularly rings true in 
wealth-crazed South Korea where “money informs their social relations” and determines 
an individual’s social value.131  
Demick notes that the “qualities most prized in South Korean society—height, fair 
skin, affluence, prestigious degrees, designer clothes, English language fluency—are 
precisely those that the newly arrived defector lacks.”132 She argues further that this 
accounts for the low self-esteem among North Korean defectors and serves as a constant 
reminder to them that they simply do not fit in.  
As another indicator, South Korea ranks number one in the world for the highest 
number of both invasive and non-invasive cosmetic procedures performed per capita.133 
Aptly nicknamed the “plastic surgery capital of the world,” South Korea sees one in five 
undergoing surgery to meet the typical South Korean beauty standard of large eyes, 
pronounced nose, and pointed chin (this figure is increased to one in three South Korean 
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women in cities).134 Women often undergo plastic surgery to be more competitive for jobs; 
parents often gift their children cosmetic procedures after they pass the National College 
Entrance Exam (soohakneungyuk shehyum); and the prevalence of South Koreans electing 
to go under the knife has made plastic surgery a social norm and solidified the western 
standard of beauty as the conventional South Korean beauty standard. Needless to say, this 
has proved quite problematic for North Korean defectors who do not understand the South 
Korean standard of beauty, while those who do are discouraged by their own appearances 
and their inability pay for elective procedures. 
A report published by the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies identifies re-settlement 
challenges facing, in particular, young North Korean refugees. It cites social discrimination 
stemming from gaps in physical health and stereotypes, as well as labor market 
discrimination perpetuated by unemployment and lack of proper education as the causal 
factors for re-settlement difficulties experienced by North Korean defectors. The ROK 
Ministry of Education and the Migrant Youth Foundation under the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family operate academic assistance programs, such as extracurricular 
activities, mentorship programs, preferential admission to prestigious secondary and/or 
tertiary-level schools, and extra academic tutoring, all aimed at successful adaptation of 
North Koreans into South Korean school systems.135 Yet, North Korean defectors continue 
to struggle and fail to meet the “optimistic expectation of [South Korea’s] trouble-free 
adaptation.”136  
Studies by Dake et al., the ASAN Institute, and Demick, concur that North Korean 
refugees “start from a lower physical baseline than their local peers.”137 They attribute this 
to food shortages starting from infancy, particularly true among the famine generation, 
which results in “North Korean children and adults being significantly shorter in height 
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and lower in weight than their South Korean peers of similar age.”138 Not only that, this 
shorter stature and smaller frame also contributes to increased bullying in schools and 
ostracism by peers, which hinders formation of friendships and ultimately results in 
lowered self-esteem and sense of hopelessness in the school environment.139 To compound 
these lowered self-esteem issues, North Korean refugees are often placed in lower grades 
with younger students. Even in this environment, North Korean students find it difficult to 
keep pace with their younger classmates and feel embarrassed, angry, and hopeless.140  
In a 2010 study, Pak calculated the median height and weight difference between 
South Korean youth and a sample of 1406 North Korean refugees between ages 6 and19. 
Pak found that, on average, South Korean male youth were 10.1cm (3.98in) taller and 
11.1kg (24.47lbs) heavier than their male North Korean counterparts. Similarly, South 
Korean female adolescents were 7.2cm (2.83in) taller and 3.8kg (8.38lbs) heavier than their 
North Korean female peers.141 The study also revealed that “long term poor eating could 
have impaired [North Korean youths’] physical and neurological functions.”142  
To better contextualize this, consider the example of Kim Hyuk, a teenager who 
defected to South Korea in 2001 when he was just nineteen years old. Having spent the 
bulk of his formative years in North Korea during the famine, Hyuk’s stature immediately 
gave away signs of a syndrome called “stunting” caused by severe childhood 
malnutrition.143 As the body is deprived of nutrition, any resource it does have, it directs 
towards the head and brain to the detriment of the limbs. As the child grows to adulthood, 
a body shape with bowed out short legs, short arms, and short torso, but a disproportionally 
large head takes form.144 At barely five feet tall with underdeveloped legs, Hyuk was at a 
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disadvantage in a height-obsessed South Korean society.145 He found that due to his short 
stature, he was ruled out as a potential marriage partner for the majority of the South 
Korean women. Lonely and desperate to find companionship, Hyuk suffered from 
resentment, frustration, depression, and terribly low self-esteem issues.  
Hyuk’s experience is not uncommon. A 2014 survey sponsored by the National 
Research Foundation of Korea found that South Koreans were only willing to embrace 
North Koreans insomuch as the North Koreans did not seek unduly intimate or personal 
relationships with them.146 Seven questions were asked to 403 participating adults, and the 
results were objectively indicative of social discrimination. When asked to answer on a 
scale of strongly agree to strongly disagree whether they (South Koreans) would accept 
North Koreans as South Korean citizens, 61.3% of respondents replied mostly-strongly 
agree.147 However, when the relationship became slightly more familiar—accepting North 
Koreans as fellow workers—the percentage of those responding mostly-strongly agree 
dropped to 58.3%.148 Furthermore, when asked if they would accept North Koreans as 
neighbors and friends, the percentage of those replying yes dropped even further to 50.1% 
and 30.1% respectively.149 Only 10.6% of participants agreed to accept North Koreans as 
business partners, highlighting the existence of an underlying layer of mistrust and 
foreignness between the two Korean peoples despite sharing same ethnic ties. Finally, most 
revealing of all, when asked if they would be willing to date, marry, or accept North 
Koreans as close kin by marriage, the percentage of respondents agreeing dropped sharply 
to 7.6%.150  
The results of this survey convey a very telling trend that South Koreans perceive 
North Koreans as second-class citizens, worthy of assistance and humanitarian aid, but not 
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of their friendship, companionship, partnership, or love. When at arm’s length, South 
Koreans show willingness to overlook the differences and extend a helping hand. However, 
as soon as the relationship becomes too intimate, the widespread and well-entrenched 
southern culture of “strong prejudice and stereotyping of North Korea and its people” 
comes to light.151 In this regard, Park summarizes elegantly by saying that “the cosmetic 
differences associated with being North Korean—such as accent, dress, and self-
presentation—have become symbolic markers of stigmatizing stereotypes.”152 
Consequently, “whether real or imagined, North Korean bodies are marked as smaller, 
foreign, and strange,” therefore unsuitable for friendship, business partnership, dating, and 
marriage.153 
This conclusion is better articulated in a 2016 interview with a North Korean 
defector, Lee Ae Ran, the recipient of the 2010 International Women of Courage Award. 
Lee noted that “the major cultural difference between North and South Koreans has to do 
with hierarchy, whereby it is hard for South Koreans to see North Koreans as equals.”154 
Though Son further adds that “this is not to say, that North Koreans are viewed as 
permanently in such a position: rather emphasis is placed on the need to level the hierarchy 
through education and socialization into the ways of the people of the South.”155 The 
problem with statements such as these is the expectation for North Korean defectors to 
conform to South Korea’s societal norms and accept the Southerners’ cultural values as 
their own. Furthermore, the indication that movement up the social hierarchy can only be 
achieved through education and conformity to the ways of the South—precisely areas 
where an average defector severely lags behind southern counterparts and struggles the 
most—further places the newly arrived North Koreans in an impossible position. 
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1. Education Gaps 
In a society that demanded its population engage in daily struggles to meet their 
basic needs, North Koreans have acquired certain survival competition skills that leave 
them ill-equipped to compete in a capitalist South Korean society. The main culprit for this 
is the fundamental differences in the basic education system. Since the advent of 
globalization, foreign direct investment and expansion of South Korean companies abroad 
have made fluency in English a highly prized skill. Consequently, English is taught starting 
at a young age, often as a mandatory supplementary course in South Korean elementary 
schools; and average South Koreans, particularly those living in urban areas, are able to 
carry-on basic conversations in English. English loaner words such as bus menu, virus, 
goalkeeper, internet, cellphone, project, etc., are prevalent in many aspects of the South 
Korean society, and are commonly used to converse in subjects ranging from basic goods 
and services to sports, politics, and the economy.156  
If the German unification serves as an example, the potential for educational 
inequality between North and South Korean students post-unification remains high. The 
results of research conducted by Klein et al. concluded that inequality in education 
opportunity (IEO) in East Germany increased after the German reunification.157 Contrary 
to popular belief, the education system in East Germany was less stratified than in West 
Germany due to the “FRG’s [Federal Republic of Germany, West Germany] highly 
selective early tracking system, in contrast to the GDR’s [German Democratic Republic, 
East Germany] more comprehensive school system.”158 This is to say that while the West 
German education system sorted children at the age of 10–12 into three non-permeable 
categories, Hauptschule (lower secondary track), Realschule (intermediate secondary 
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track), and Gymnasium (upper secondary track), the Socialist Unity Party of Germany 
(SED) implemented a more homogenous, and compulsory education system.159 Among 
the three tracks, only one, Gymnasium, led to an Abitur certificate, which allowed students 
to pursue tertiary education. On the other hand, all East German children attended the same 
comprehensive lower and intermediate track schools, “where low-achieving students 
experienced significant support and high-performing students received considerably 
less.”160 Klein further notes that the GDR came closer to an educationally meritocratic 
ideal than the FRG because the ruling Socialist party “intervened against intergenerational 
reproduction by imposing meritocracy and explicit policies to reduce inequalities.”161  
Post-German unification, however, Lothar de Maiziere, the prime minister of East 
Germany from April to October 1990, led the effort to adjust the East German education 
systems to West German standards.162 An education commission was established in May 
1990 to oversee the unification of the two German education systems, but in the process, 
by 1994, over 13,000 East German university positions had been eliminated, 20,000 
additional people lost their jobs, and 8,000 scholars saw their credentials discredited.163 
Nearly three decades on, Zawilska notes that “the consequences of the replacement of the 
academic elite are readily noticeable today [as] only three among 88 German university 
rectors come from the new federal states [i.e., former-East Germany].”164 Klein concurs 
and adds that as East Germany adopted more and more of West Germany’s education 
system, decisions whether to attempt Abitar or not was “made earlier in the child’s life 
across all eastern states.”165 Consequently, this premature placement of students onto one 
of three “tracks,” only one of which afforded the opportunity to pursue college education, 
severely disadvantaged East German students, who had been previously unexposed to the 
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West German education system. Accordingly, inequality of education opportunities rose 
sharply in East Germany in the 1990s in the immediate aftermath of German reunification.  
In the context of Korean reunification, Kim Pil Ju, a North Korean who defected to 
South Korea in 2006, sheds some light into potential education inequalities that may arise 
in the event of integrated school systems, as current defector adjustment problems “offer a 
glimpse of the social integration challenges likely after unification.”166 In a 2017 
interview, when asked what the biggest challenge was in assimilating into South Korean 
society, Kim cited the language barrier resulting from English loan words as being among 
his top difficulties to overcome.167 When Kim entered college, he recalls that this language 
barrier made successfully completing his college education extraordinarily difficult. In 
2005 research conducted by the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights 
(DCNKHR), 66 out of 126, or 52%, of the teenage defectors surveyed responded that 
English was by far their hardest subject in school.168 This hardship continued into their 
college years, where the North Korean students who had taken the Test of English for 
International Communication (TOEIC) scored 445, an average of 100 points below the 
South Korean average of 534.169 
The most glaring issue, however, was the reasoning the North Korean students gave 
for their below-average English skills. Though 27 out of 60 North Korean defectors who 
were interviewed acknowledged that finding employment in South Korea was the single 
biggest motivator for learning English, over half (31/60) stated that they could not afford 
to enroll in private English tutoring centers—quite ubiquitous in South Korea—or pay for 
extra tutoring sessions. Thus, “a vicious cycle is generated wherein the economic burden 
for private English education results in lower English proficiency which then becomes an 
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obstacle to job acquisition. In turn, the low prospects for job acquisition create economic 
burdens.”170  
Hyun reports that the biggest issue facing teenage defectors is the difference 
between the north and south’s education systems.171 She claims that as students progress, 
their likelihood of falling behind and eventually dropping out of school increases 
exponentially: 0.2% dropout rate in elementary school, 2.9% in middle school, and 7.3% 
in high school. In total, by the time North Korean defector students reach high school 
graduation, close to 11% have been unsuccessful in completing their education.172 In a 
South Korean society that boasts a national 97% graduation rate, the highest graduation 
rate among OECD nations, the disparity between north and south’s education systems 
severely disadvantages North Koreans from thriving in a South Korean society where 
education is the building block and the determinant factor for everything else in 
life.173While it is probable that there could be more education equalization efforts after the 
unification to better accommodate the growing number of North Korean students, the 
existing gap between the North and South’s education systems leaves much ground for the 
North Korean students to make up if they are to survive in South Korean society. 
According to the Ministry of Unification, the main reasons North Koreans 
frequently cite for this alarmingly high dropout rate include maladjustment to school, poor 
and unstable family conditions, and the Qualification Examination for Advancement to 
Higher State Education (or kumjeonggosi), a standardized test that is administered to those 
who did not complete high school.174 Kim and Jang explain that the “saeteomin youth 
experience maladjustment because of the hiatus in their studies, the different content and 
pedagogy of South Korean education, and isolation from South Korean peers. These 
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unfavorable conditions aggravate saeteomin youth drop-out rates, and sharply reduce the 
possibility that saeteomin children will live a better life in South Korean society.”175  
However, research by the DCNKHR gives slightly different reasons for the high 
rate of teenage defector dropouts: poor academic records, conflicts with friends, and being 
older than their classmates. Often, the number of years of North Korean schooling 
automatically determines a defector’s placement in South Korean schools.176 As such, 
most defectors are placed in grades with much younger South Korean students, “triggering 
emotional discomfort, such as loss of pride and consequently maladjustment.”177 
Furthermore, North Korean students have trouble making friends, are often bullied, and 
most often choose other North Korean defectors as their friends and “most comfortable 
dialogue partners two-to-one over South Korean friends.”178   
Not all research is bleak, however. According to the Korean Educational Statistics 
Service, the collective North Korean dropout rate of primary, middle, and high school 
students combined was, quite surprisingly, just 2.0% in 2017.179 Though slightly higher 
than the combined dropout rate of 0.71% among South Korean students, when compared 
to the North Korean dropout rate of nearly 11% in just 2008, this is still a remarkable 
improvement that signals some notable changes in the South Korean education system.180 
However, it is still important to note that this decline in dropout rate does not account for 
the relatively low overall attendance rate—number of days present in school—among 
North Korean students. Saeteomin may no longer be dropping completely out of school, 
but they are still ten times more likely to miss school days.181 In the past few years, the 
South Korean educators and policy makers have started to make appropriate adjustments 
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and changes in policy to better accommodate the defectors. This is evident in the ROK 
Ministry of Education’s identification of five “main tasks” to reform South Korean schools. 
Even though these key policies changes were not undertaken specifically to combat the 
challenges that North Korean students face in schools, at least three out of the five main 
taskers directly address the North Korean students’ needs.  
First, the ministry’s “Education that Leaves no Child Behind” initiative “endeavors 
to achieve equal opportunity” by providing educational support and after-school programs 
for students with disadvantaged backgrounds.182 It further identifies North Korean 
students, students from multi-cultural families (children with at least one immigrant 
parent), and those with disabilities as prime targets of financial aid. Second, in an effort to 
ease the financial burden of education, South Korea enacted the Public Education 
Normalization Promotion Act, which “prohibits teaching student to a test, solely to help 
students receive a high score on school assessments and university entrance exams.”183 
The legislation further aims to discourage the rampant use of expensive private tutoring 
teachers/centers by preventing teaching of content that requires supplementary learning 
beyond the school setting. Finally, to provide a safer school environment to address 
bullying and rising teenage depression and suicides, the ministry has pledged to end child 
abuse, prioritize child safety, and prevent school violence. Cumulatively, these three MOE 
policy initiatives are indisputably a step in the right direction to better accommodate 
saeteomin youth, and prepare for a potential Korean unification in which the South could 
see a significant increase in North Korean youths.  
2. Labor Market Discrimination
By age fifteen, mandatory state education—the content and quality of which 
remains dubious at best—is complete, and North Korean students begin applying to high 
schools.184 As selection is based on the student’s songbun, the majority find themselves 
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rejected from continuing their education and assigned to a work unit.185 Rare exceptions 
are made for extraordinary or unique talent, but for the majority of the North Korean 
population, a job assignment at age fifteen means a lifetime of strenuous work in a textile/
manufacturing factory, the coal mines, or the like. As such, this leaves many North Koreans 
with low value-chain skills that leave them ill-suited to thrive in a service sector-oriented 
South Korean economy.  
Bidet cites the source of main labor market discrimination as exclusion from regular 
jobs, meaning, that the “relatively well-paid, stable employment with good working 
conditions and promotion prospects” are not being offered to North Koreans.186 Rather, 
North Koreans are being subjugated to what he calls secondary market jobs that are dirty, 
difficult, and dangerous (3D).187 Amid the less than 4% unemployment rate among the 
South Korean population, 30–40% of the 32,000 North Koreans defectors currently living 
in South Korea are unemployed.188 When they have a job, North Koreans tend to fill 
unsecured, daily, or temporary jobs, with their length of stay at any particular job being 
much shorter than that of South Korean workers. Despite having equivalent experience 
levels and comparable educational backgrounds, North Koreans’ wages are much lower 
than those of South Koreans filling similar positions.189 Even in the low-skill job market, 
South Korean laborers earn wages that are 1.5-2.5 times that of North Korean defectors.190 
On average, income remains very low for North Korean defectors, with more than 95% 
percent of them earning wages that are below the national average.191 Approximately 80% 
of North Korean defectors need social welfare or government assisted funds to get by, and 
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“those who are employed are involved in part-time employments, physical labors, or 
service type employments.”192 
In some aspects, North Koreans are being forced into the secondary labor market 
through discriminatory practices; but in other cases, they are resigned to 3D jobs because 
those are simply the only jobs they are qualified to perform. The former is well-documented 
through defector testimony, surveys, and reports like the 2014 ASAN Institute report on 
the resettlement challenges of young North Korean refugees. According to this report, 
“North Korean refugees in the workplace report having similar experience of social 
discrimination by their co-workers and superiors.”193 For example, an employer who hired 
a North Korean defector “expressed fear that his employee might kill others if provoked 
emotionally.”194 Above all, the biggest issue hindering socio-economic integration seems 
to be “the problem of trust among defectors and between defectors and South Koreans,” in 
which “mutual trust” between the two groups seems almost non-existent.195  This is 
particularly evident in the pigeonholing characterization of northern workers in southern 
society. While North Korean defectors generally cite heartlessness and hardship “accepting 
an environment in which a person is judged only by his money” as the main challenges of 
their labor integration, Southerners describe North Koreans as “impolite, selfish, and prone 
to lies and exaggerations about their past.”196 O further adds that: 
Many North Korean defectors also face prejudice from some South 
Koreans, who perceive the defectors as socialists who are dependent, 
passive, lazy, and selfish. Still other South Koreans are simply too busy, 
focused on their own lives, to show much interest.197  
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The accumulation of anti-North Korean defector sentiments such as these culminates in 
defectors being treated as “second class citizens,” and being overwhelmed “by their new 
surroundings [in which they] find it difficult to compete.”198 
Even if we were to examine more closely the latter factor—the defectors’ 
unsuitability for anything but 3D jobs—behind the shunting of North Koreans into the 
secondary job market, “the strong homophily of social relations [that is] stressed as a 
distinctive feature of social organization in South Korea, where one observes a high 
tendency to generate social groups gathering persons with similar characteristics,” 
perpetuates the vicious cycle of poverty and second-class citizenship among North 
Koreans.199 Harkening back to the hierarchical and golden-track nature of South Korean 
society, this results in what Bidet calls “a pattern of primary solidarity, such that 
interpersonal relations revolve around persons with similar background with regard to 
education, geographical origin, or kinship.”200 Therefore, almost undoubtedly, the very 
nature of South Korean society makes it even more difficult for “North Korean defectors, 
to access resources and achieve socio-economic integration.”201 Furthermore, this 
“homophily” of South Korea’s social organization can explain why poverty in South Korea 
tends to continuously “advantage members of advantaged groups and disadvantage 
members of disadvantaged groups.”202  
In discussing the potential for heightening labor market discrimination post- 
unification, current defector experiences are likely a microcosm of what is to come. This 
is particularly true as the already saturated South Korean labor market experiences an 
influx of northern migrants competing for employment. The ASAN Institute aptly notes 
that: 
Even after taking into account the inevitable cultural misunderstandings 
when dealing with recently arrived North Korean refugees, South Korea’s 
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strong prejudice and stereotyping of North Korea and its people are 
widespread and well entrenched.203  
Fear and prejudice such as these translate poorly to the labor market as South Koreans 
prove less willing to hire North Korean defectors when given a choice.204 
However, the most recent 2018 Korean Hana Foundation shows some promise in 
the projecting the future integration of North Korean defectors into the South Korean 
society. Surveying 2710 defectors living in the South, the survey found that employment 
rose by 3% from 57% in 2017 to 60% in 2018.205 Of the employed defectors, most “had 
been at their jobs for an average of 27 months in 2018, up two months from the previous 
year.”206 And among those who received wages, “64% were considered regular [salaried] 
employees in 2018,” up 7% from 2017.207 Additionally, average wages also increased for 
North Korean defectors, “with the gross income for defector households rising from 
USD$23,530 [in 2017], to USD$24,830 [in 2018].”208 According to Lim, “the 
unemployment rate of North Korean defectors in South Korea is decreasing and the gap 
with [South Korean counterparts] narrowing.”209 Though still far from equal, compared to 
2003 KINU survey results in which “40% of defectors [had] a monthly income below 
500,000₩ [USD$450] and more than 85% below 1,000,000₩ [USD$900], [while] 10% 
of South Korean households [had] a [monthly] income below 450,000₩ and 20% below 
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1,100,000₩, improvements have been made in the past decade towards economic 
equality.210  
Though the recent improvements in the defectors’ economic conditions signal good 
news for the prospective labor integration of northern migrants into the South Korean work 
force, the issue still remains that the organization of the South Korean society makes it 
very difficult for North Koreans to penetrate the social divide. Not only that, the gap 
between the economic conditions of North and South Koreans, though narrowing, still 
remains fairly wide. A 60% employment rate among northern defectors in 2018 is hardly 
impressive when put into perspective with a 96.2% employment rate among South 
Koreans.211 And an increase of USD$1,300 in the defectors’ household income 
(USD$24,830) pales in comparison to USD$40,464 gross income among South Korean 
workers.212 While indications that North Korean defectors fared better economically in 
2018 bodes well for the future, the ingrained South Korean pattern of strong social 
homophily that naturally excludes North Koreans, as well as widespread southern 
preconceptions and negative stereotyping, are causes for legitimate concern when 
contemplating the labor integration of the two Korean societies, particularly given the 
current competitiveness of the South Korean labor market.  
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V. SOUTH-NORTH MIGRATION AND “CARPETBAGGING” 
BEHAVIOR  
This thesis approached Korean reunification, by and large, from a South Korean 
point of view, considering what happen if North Koreans intrude on the South Korean way 
of life. This approach was taken for several reasons, the most pressing of which was the 
dearth of primary and secondary sources available on North Korea. Given this assumption 
of reunification under Seoul’s terms, the scope of this thesis did not allow for a complete 
and thorough exploration of potential social issues from a North Korean perspective. This 
short chapter examines one: northern migration by opportunistic South Korean 
entrepreneurs and businesses.  
Existing literature on this topic identifies opposing arguments surrounding the 
development of northern infrastructure, specifically as it pertains to mining of rare earth 
minerals.213 On one hand, optimists about post-reunification inter-Korean mining 
operations claim that extraction of mineral resources has the potential to be mutually 
beneficial insofar the North receives help from the South to build proper infrastructure, 
acquire modern mining equipment and technology, and build reliable and sustainable 
sources of power. South Korea would similarly benefit by gaining an internal supply of 
mineral resources crucial to sustaining its domestic industries, whose revenues make up 
half of the South Korean GDP. On the other hand, cynics argue that North Korea’s rich 
minerals have the potential to attract carpetbaggers from South Korea seeking to advance 
their capitalist interests, particularly since “South Korea depends on imports of mineral 
commodities from overseas due to its own poor supply of mineral resources.”214 Thus, 
North Korea should be wary of its vulnerability to potential exploitation.  
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General consensus exists, however, that developing infrastructure in the northern 
half would have lasting benefits for both Koreas.215 However, the literature does not fully 
address the Northerners’ potential vulnerability to exploitation by southern businesspeople 
and industries. Thus, in an effort to give due-diligence attention to what could happen if 
South Koreans intrude on the northern way of life, and to suggest a topic for further 
consideration by future researchers, this thesis will now briefly consider the subject of 
“carpetbagging” behavior among South Koreans capitalists, businesses, and industries 
post-reunification.  
When the Korean peninsula was effectively partitioned post World War II, the 
south ended up with the bulk of the peninsula’s arable land and milder weather. The 
majority of the northern half was perceived to be covered with fairly inhospitable granite 
mountains until the 1980s, when discovery of precious minerals sparked the initial heavy 
industrial development. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, “North Korea’s immense energy 
potential has pushed several South Korean conglomerates, including KORES [Korea 
Resources Corporation], to invest in mining projects in the North and to consider the 
development of infrastructures to facilitate rare earth exploitation.”216 More recently, 
reports from the North Korea Resources Institute, based in Seoul, indicated that North 
Korea was sitting atop US$6-10 trillion worth of untapped precious and rare earth minerals. 
Over 200 different types of minerals are distributed across 80% of the country, and North 
Korea boasts large deposits of some of the world’s most precious minerals.217 Based on 
these estimates, this could mean that the value of North Korea’s mineral resources is 
approximately 21 times that of South Korea.218  
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In the event of reunification, both North and South Korea would have much to gain 
by resuming mining operations. Inter-Korean mining cooperation would increase North 
Korea’s mineral production and catapult its economic growth, while South Korean heavy 
industries would gain valuable resources and cease importing often-overpriced minerals to 
sustain their operations.219 Since 2001, when inter-Korean mining operations first began, 
foreign companies from China, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States have 
engaged in 25 mining projects in North Korea.220 This inter-Korean mining relationship 
continued until 2010, when a steady increase in North Korean nuclear and military activity 
fractured the North-South relationship and halted joint mining operations. Since then, 
North Korea has attempted to sustain its mining operations, but insufficient electricity, 
antiquated equipment, restricted financial assistance,  and poorly maintained facilities have 
led to a drastic downfall.221 Additionally, foreign investors have been thoroughly spooked 
by and increasingly frustrated with their inability to establish independently operating 
mining facilities, further diminishing an already slow stream of foreign investment.222  
This is precisely where South Korea can help by spearheading a post-reunification 
revival of inter-Korean mining operations. Undoubtedly, resumption of joint mining 
operations would spark South Korean interests in investing in northern development. 
Considering that North Korea’s large mineral reserves are spread out across 80% of the 
country, development of the mining sector as a whole would mean development across 
multiple provinces, particularly in areas far away from Pyongyang that have historically 
been overlooked.223 Additionally, energy shortages, unreliable power grids, and 
antiquated equipment and technology are some of the key challenges hindering North 
Korean mineral production.224 As a leader in the world’s technology sector, South Korea 
can help restructure the north’s power system and construct large-scale hydroelectric 
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plants. In return, South Korea would be securing a valuable supply of minerals that would 
effectively eliminate its current reliance on overseas mineral imports and thus drastically 
reduce production costs.225  
South Korean conglomerates known colloquially as chaebols dominate a fair share 
of the world’s technology and innovation market. North Korea’s untapped mineral 
resources may prove to be exceptionally alluring to companies like Hyundai, Samsung, 
LG, and SK, who rely almost exclusively on imported minerals to produce semi-
conductors, an essential component of majority of these conglomerates’ exports. An 
internal source of minerals would eliminate the chaebol’s vulnerability to changes in 
international resources prices, and directly investing in North Korean mining projects 
would ensure that “an increment of [the] international resources price would return to [the] 
South Korean companies.”226 Thus, it is no surprise that the chaebols of South Korea have 
a vested interest in seeking inter-Korean mining operations post-reunification and would 
be agreeable to funding the initial investment costs. 
However, due to North Korea’s weak organization and the lucrative nature of its 
minerals, it is prudent to be aware of any potential influx of South Korean carpetbaggers 
into North Korea who may seek to exploit its resources. “Carpetbagging” is a term derived 
from the American Civil War that carries an underlying tone of exploitation and greed. It 
refers to victorious Northerners viewed as descending on the war-ravaged Confederate 
States with carpet bags filled with cash to bribe and buy up plantations, natural resources, 
and cheap labor.227 This term fits comfortably within the Korean inter-mining context 
because of the similar potential for North Koreans to be exploited by South Koreans viewed 
as greedy and capitalistic. Lankov warns that it will be more necessary to protect the 
Northerners from predatory southern businesses.228 This claim is supported by the 
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unfortunate fact that one in five North Korean defectors is victimized by fraud, Ponzi 
schemes, or other shady business practices, a rate approximately 40% higher than the 
national South Korean average.229 Lankov further notes that post-reunification, North 
Korea “may find itself under the control of opportunistic Kim-era ex-bureaucrats, puppets 
of Beijing, or South Korean carpetbaggers,” and should therefore begin early training of 
its administrators, engineers, managers, and scholars.230  
A 2015 study on investment potential for development and manufacturing of 
mineral resources in North Korea brings up a salient point on the potential division of labor, 
with South Koreans as management and North Koreans as labor. This argument of division 
of labor has merit, particularly because this split between northern workers versus southern 
management would serve as yet another symbol of the societal divide that characterizes the 
poorer and therefore apparently inferior North, and the richer, superior South. Post-
reunification, stark differences in education levels and standards of living will be 
transparent enough without yet another marker of the Korean social divergence. If the 
southern capitalist carpetbaggers rush north to privatize mining industries, then 
Northerners will see their role diminished to mere low-skilled laborers even in their own 
former-country, while Southerners will be reinforced of their identity as the better of the 
two Korean groups. Consequently, just as it was the case in unified Germany when 
Easterners resented Westerners for their greater successes, we can foresee the “possibility 
of economically prosperous southern capitalists becoming an object of [northern] envy and 
hatred.”231 This hatred and envy, coupled with the perception of being exploited, has the 
potential to boil over into social unrest and increased social friction and certainly make 
social integration challenging.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
For North and South Koreans to truly reach social parity post-reunification, 
adequate preparation before, and realistic expectations afterwards, are essential. In the 
aftermath of German unification, “the politicians focused primarily on adjusting the 
political, administrative and economic institutions of East Germany to Western standards,” 
while disregarding the cultural and social differences between the two German 
societies.232 In doing so, East and West Germany failed to fully socially integrate, creating 
the long-lasting social tension, sense of foreignness, and “phantom wall” that still divide 
the two German societies almost three decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall.233  
Assuming a peaceful Korean reunification in which North Korea is absorbed into 
South Korea, this thesis aimed to bridge a gap in existing literature, which focuses almost 
exclusively on potential political, security, and economic implications of reunification. In 
examining the likely social implications of such an event, this thesis has argued that despite 
similarities in culture, language, historical legacies, and, most importantly, shared ethnic 
identities, two sets of social issues—North-South population migration and pervasive 
discrimination—have the potential to be even more divisive and socially costly than similar 
issues experienced during and after German unification. Furthermore, this thesis has found 
that existing issues within South Korean society, such as infrastructure limitations, socio-
spatial inequalities, labor crowding and competition, and social discrimination, are likely 
to multiply, intensify, and worsen in the event of a complete integration of the two Korean 
societies.  
This thesis was organized to analyze the social implications of a potential Korean 
reunification from a South Korean perspective due to the sparsity of credible and verifiable 
sources from North Korea. Accordingly, estimations and conclusions were drawn by 
analyzing the existing trends in South Korean society and taking into account the German 
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unification example. As defector experiences shed light on existing social issues that could 
worsen with complete social integration, this thesis paid close attention to the adjustment 
problems that current North Korean defectors face in South Korea, which “offer a glimpse 
of the social integration challenges likely after unification.”234  
The thesis first introduced shared ethnic identity as the strongest rationale behind 
the push for reunification, as shared ethnic roots remain the foundation for what little link 
remains between North and South Korea. In exploring the historicity of this shared ethnic 
identity, this thesis found that the intra-South Korean national identity is evolving, 
particularly among the younger generations, such that South Koreans are increasingly 
rejecting the notion of ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism as the glue that unites the two 
Koreas. In doing so, this thesis has suggested that if ethnic nationalism continues to fade 
among South Koreans, then the primary driver of reunification could face real challenges 
as the two Korean societies continue to diverge.  
This thesis then examined the likelihood of North-South migration and population 
movement in a unified Korea. It detailed the potential consequences of a sudden influx of 
North Koreans into South Korean society and found that due to the changes in defector 
demographics since the early 2000s, with current average defectors economically 
motivated with little political utility, a full-fledged social integration of North Koreans with 
similar backgrounds, education levels, skill sets, and motivations could see a growth of the 
labor crowding effect, and exacerbation of infrastructure limitations and socio-spatial 
inequality.  
This thesis next explored growing social discrimination and the probable 
emergence of a new class system, in which future North Korean migrants might be 
rendered second-class citizens, much like current defectors living in South Korea. As was 
the case post-German unification, this thesis argued that the growing social distance 
between North and South Koreans can be attributed to differences in their respective 
cultural and societal values, which leave defectors unable to adjust to or accept a southern 
society in which “social mobility and economic opportunities are connected to family 
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background, education level, social standing, and school ties.”235 In addition, the south’s 
strong social homophily makes it unlikely that future North Korean migrants will be 
immediately successful in integrating into South Korean society.  
Finally, this thesis briefly considered what could happen if South Koreans intrude 
on the northern way of life. Analyzing from a North Korean perspective, this thesis 
examined one potential repercussion of South-North migration in a unified Korea: potential 
rise of “carpetbagging” behavior among South Korean businesspeople, entrepreneurs, and 
industries. While exploring the likely mutual gains from revitalizing inter-Korean mining 
operations and stimulating southern investment to rebuild northern infrastructure, this 
thesis also addressed the Northerners’ vulnerability to exploitation and the possibility for 
South-North migration to perpetuate the image of North Koreans as labor, and South 
Koreans as “possessors, givers, and cultural superiors.”236 
The premise of shared ethnic homogeneity as the driving force for Korean 
unification creates a false sense of unity. North and South Koreans have been separated 
longer than East and West Germans has been, and under less amicable, less porous, and 
ever widening economic conditions, and so we can expect the social integration of the two 
Koreas to be just as challenging, if not more so, than that following German unification. 
As such, when discussing Korean reunification, the potential social implications should be 
considered on equal footing with more often-debated security and economic implications. 
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